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1 
Crime-Severity Distinctions and the 
Fourth Amendment: Reassessing 
Reasonableness in a Changing World 
Jeffrey Bellin 
ABSTRACT: A growing body of commentary calls for the Supreme Court to 
recalibrate its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in response to technological 
and social changes that threaten the traditional balance between public 
safety and personal liberty. This Article joins the discussion, highlighting a 
largely overlooked consideration that should be included in any 
modernization of Fourth Amendment doctrine—crime severity. 
The Supreme Court emphasizes that “reasonableness” is the “touchstone” of 
Fourth Amendment analysis. Yet, in evaluating contested searches and 
seizures, current Fourth Amendment doctrine ignores a key determinant of 
reasonableness, the crime under investigation. As a result, an invasive 
search of a suspected murderer is, legally speaking, no more or less 
reasonable than the same search of a suspected jaywalker. 
Through the years, the primary objection raised by the Supreme Court and 
academics to altering this status quo is that a crime-severity variable would 
be unworkable. While a handful of scholars continue to argue for an 
increased role for crime severity in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this 
powerful objection remains unanswered. In an effort to fill this void in the 
debate, and introduce crime severity as a critical component of a revitalized 
search and seizure jurisprudence, this Article proposes a concrete framework 
for incorporating crime severity into Fourth Amendment doctrine. The 
Article then explores specific applications of the framework to highlight the 
constructive role crime-severity distinctions can play in defining the 
constitutional parameters of searches and seizures in the modern era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few people objected when Los Angeles police relied on the 
controversial practice of familial DNA searches to identify a suspect in the 
“Grim Sleeper” serial-killer case.1 For those who might worry about the 
implications of such searches, the reporting noted that the California 
Attorney General only permitted familial DNA searches in investigations of 
“major violent crimes,” such as murder or rape.2 Slightly more controversy 
attended the Governor of New York’s signing of legislation that prohibited 
New York City police from creating a massive computerized database of 
persons they stopped, even if those persons were not charged with any 
crime.3 The police claimed the database helped crack cases, but the 
Governor explained that he could not condone the practice absent evidence 
that it stopped “very serious crime, or . . . acts of terrorism.”4 Finally, 
condemnation was nearly universal when a Pennsylvania school district, 
suspecting the theft of some school-issued laptop computers, activated 
software in the computers that surreptitiously took pictures of students and 
their families in their homes.5 The technology helped locate the missing 
 
 1. See David R. Cameron, DNA Matching Technique Is a Powerful Tool for Police, HARTFORD 
COURANT, July 13, 2010, http://articles.courant.com/2010-07-13/news/hc-op-familial-
searching-cameron-071320100713_1_offender-profiles-dna-expert-new-dna-technique (noting 
that “even critics of aggressive approaches to gathering DNA . . . applauded how familial 
searching was used in the Grim Sleeper case” and quoting an attorney with the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Southern California, who commented, “From our perspective, if you are 
going to use familial DNA searching, this is the kind of case you should use it for” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Elizabeth Joh, The Grim Sleeper and DNA: There’s Much To Be Concerned 
About, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/10/opinion/la-oe-joh-
dna-20100710 (cautioning that the “investigative triumph” of the Grim Sleeper case should not 
“blind us to the dangers of expanding genetic surveillance”); Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Grim Sleeper’ 
Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A14 (reporting expert consensus that 
“[t]he arrest in the protracted, gory case could settle the internal debate among lawmakers and 
the law enforcement agencies across the country” regarding familial DNA searches). 
 2. Press Release, Cal. Att’y Gen.’s Office, California’s Familial DNA Search Program 
Identifies Suspected “Grim Sleeper” Serial Killer (July 7, 2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/ 
newsalerts/release.php?id=1945 (explaining that under internal guidelines, familial DNA 
searches “are only allowed in major violent crimes when there is a serious risk to public safety 
and all other investigative leads have been exhausted”); see Editorial, A Yellow Light to DNA 
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A24; Post-Standard Editorial Board, DNA Searches: Partial 
Matches Can Help Solve Crimes—If Used Carefully, SYRACUSE.COM BLOG (July 15, 2010, 6:15 PM), 
http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2010/07/dna_searches_partial_matches_c.html. For an 
extensive discussion of familial DNA searches, see Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and 
DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309 (2010). 
 3. Ray Rivera & Al Baker, Police Cite Help from Stop-and-Frisk Data in 170 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2010, at A15. 
 4. Id. 
 5. John P. Martin, Judge Orders L. Merion To Halt Monitoring, PHILLY.COM (May 15, 2010), 
http://articles.philly.com/2010-05-15/news/24960045_1_webcams-laptops-injunction (noting 
the school district’s acceptance of responsibility and apology to students and their families). 
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laptops but was derided as “overkill,” saddling the school district with a 
“coast-to-coast onslaught of negative publicity.”6 These examples, all drawn 
from the last year, highlight the rapid changes unfolding in the landscape of 
criminal investigation and, simultaneously, expose a flaw in existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine’s ability to respond to these changes—its failure to 
consider a variable that nonjudicial decision-makers routinely rely on in this 
context, crime severity. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches and 
seizures.7 A key intuitive component of reasonableness is the seriousness of 
the crime investigated: “some crimes are worse than others” and those 
crimes (and only those crimes) warrant a more aggressive law enforcement 
response.8 Yet, Fourth Amendment doctrine is “transsubstantive,” meaning 
that “Fourth Amendment law generally treats all crimes alike.”9 Apart from 
circumstances involving imminent harm,10 the legal standard for evaluating 
 
 6. William Bender, Spying on L. Merion Students Sparks Probes by FBI, Montco Detectives, 
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 20, 2010, at 3 (reporting negative publicity along with criminal probes 
initiated by local and federal law enforcement in wake of school-district surveillance); see also 
Joseph Tanfani, How School Web Cam Debacle Evolved, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 21, 2010), http:// 
articles.philly.com/2010-03-21/news/25215619_1_web-cam-computer-files-school-board-
member (noting school officials’ retrieval of most of the missing laptops); Editorial: Untangling a 
Legal Web, PHILLY.COM (July 20, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-07-20/news/ 
24968967_1_webcam-laptops-school-issued (condemning district’s actions, in part, because 
“[a]s an antitheft strategy, the webcam tracking was overkill”). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 8. William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 875 (2001) (“[T]he worst crimes are the most important 
ones to solve, the ones worth paying the largest price in intrusions on citizens’ liberty and 
privacy.”); see also sources cited infra notes 28, 30. 
 9. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 869; Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 
2633, 2651 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) 
(highlighting as a “basic principle of the Fourth Amendment” that officers “can enforce with 
the same vigor all rules and regulations irrespective of the[ir] perceived importance” and 
noting that the “Fourth Amendment rule for searches is the same: Police officers are entitled to 
search regardless of the perceived triviality of the underlying law”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) n.8 (3d ed. 2007) (“[D]istinction[s] between major and minor 
crimes are rare in the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure.”); Max Minzner, Putting 
Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 940 (2009) (“Currently, the Fourth 
Amendment is blind to the type of crime underlying the search.”); Erin Murphy, The Case 
Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1239, 1244 (2009) (“For better or for worse, we have a trans-substantive Fourth Amendment.”); 
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002) (“[M]ost 
constitutional limits on policing are transsubstantive—they apply equally to suspected drug 
dealers and suspected terrorists.”). 
 10. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart 
an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a 
particular route.”); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000) (“[A] report of a person 
carrying a bomb need [not] bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person 
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”); Craig S. Lerner, The 
Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 1010–11 (2003) (recognizing that “courts 
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a search (or seizure) is the same whether a police officer suspects that a 
person jaywalked or is the Green River Killer.11 
Transsubstantive doctrine has real consequences. Perhaps the most 
significant of these is that by opening a gulf between actual “reasonableness” 
and doctrinal “reasonableness,” transsubstantive doctrine fosters artificially 
permissive Fourth Amendment rules.12 From a judicial perspective, the 
absence of a crime-severity variable means that in order to ensure that the 
authorities possess wide latitude to aggressively (and often reasonably) 
investigate the gravest offenses, courts must permit police to (often 
unreasonably) apply the same aggressive tactics to the pursuit of less serious 
offenders—a much broader category of investigations that includes most 
police–citizen interactions.13 
This often overlooked facet of Fourth Amendment doctrine will 
become increasingly significant as new technologies—particularly those that 
enable searches at opposite extremes of the invasiveness spectrum14—
challenge existing conceptions of what is and is not reasonable. The 
examples cited at the outset of this Article only hint at the array of powerful 
surveillance tools now available to law enforcement. New technologies allow 
the state to investigate its citizens as never before, using satellite imagery, 
miniature surveillance cameras, facial recognition software, DNA databases, 
e-mail filters, and so on.15 The volume of personal data that the 
 
have considered the gravity of the suspected offense” in evaluating “exigent circumstances”). 
But see Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1976 
n.67 (arguing that the case law seems to focus primarily on whether there is an exigency 
unrelated to catching criminals, and “[t]he seriousness of the crime being detected or deterred 
seems to be less significant (unless perhaps it rises to the level of ‘terrorist attack’)” (citation 
omitted)). 
 11. For an example of a search upheld based on probable cause for jaywalking, see United 
States v. Battles, No. 8:07CR337, 2008 WL 2323369, at *1 (D. Neb. June 2, 2008). For 
background on the investigation of the Green River Killer, see Matthew R. Wilmot, Note, 
Sparing Gary Ridgway: The Demise of the Death Penalty in Washington State?, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
435, 435–36 (2005). 
 12. See discussion infra Part II; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994) (“Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they distort 
doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really violated.”); John Kaplan, The Limits of 
the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1974) (stating that “courts often stretch and 
strain in serious cases to avoid applying the exclusionary rule” and identifying suspicious cases 
of judicial distortion); Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2140 (“Judges and Justices are likely to think 
about the effect of their decisions on the fight against terrorism even when the underlying cases 
involve more ordinary sorts of policing.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth 
Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 198 
(2005) (“[I]t is hard to believe that the terror war’s shadow does not fall across all search and 
seizure questions, for any case arising outside of a combat situation may lay a precedent that will 
be of future use (or harm) in the war.”). 
 13. See infra note 81. 
 14. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 15. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on 
Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 533–34 (2007) 
A1 - BELLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/30/20112:18 PM 
6 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1 
government’s expanding surveillance arsenal can be applied to—much of it 
voluntarily disclosed to private third parties (e.g., Facebook)—is expanding 
as well.16 As courts address the novel, often breathtaking privacy intrusions 
on the horizon, transsubstantive doctrine deprives them of a key variable for 
assessing reasonableness. In fact, the courts’ inability to consider crime 
severity may cause judges to resist labeling technological intrusions 
“searches” altogether to ensure that powerful surveillance tools remain 
available to authorities investigating the worst crimes.17 
This Article proposes that courts abandon transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. In particular, it suggests that as judges develop new 
rules to apply the Fourth Amendment in the modern era, they incorporate 
the severity of the crime being investigated into determinations of 
constitutional reasonableness. The introduction of a crime-severity variable 
into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would operate on multiple levels. It 
would grant the government more leeway in investigations of the gravest 
offenses, while simultaneously enabling concrete limits on investigations of 
minor crimes. Perhaps most important, explicit consideration of crime 
severity would minimize doctrinal distortions that inevitably arise (and favor 
the state) when courts must judge all searches and seizures by the same 
standard.18 
Long before modern technologies made the issue so compelling, 
commentators criticized the omission of crime severity from the Fourth 
 
(setting out similar list of “powerful new surveillance technologies used by law enforcement 
agents” with examples of usage); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343 (2008) (describing the practice of “data mining” where the 
government assembles personal data and analyzes it “for particular patterns of behavior 
deemed to be suspicious”); infra Part IV.D. 
 16. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding 
that placing GPS tracking device on the underside of the car of a person suspected of growing 
marijuana did not constitute a search); Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 299 (Ga. 2010) 
(rejecting claim that police violated the Fourth Amendment by having the suspect’s “cell phone 
provider ‘ping’ his phone” to obtain its location); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000) (“[T]he state and the private sector now enjoy unprecedented 
abilities to collect personal data, and . . . technological developments suggest that costs of data 
collection and surveillance will decrease, while the quantity and quality of data will increase.”); 
Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 1514, 1556–57 (2010) (providing examples of how new “intermediated 
communications technologies empower the police” and warning that “we are all being watched 
more closely and more often than we ever have been”); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic 
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1265 (2004) (explaining that modern 
“technology has given the government an unprecedented ability to engage in surveillance”); 
Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html (discussing radical changes in the 
amount of information that people voluntarily place into the public domain). 
 17. See infra Part IV.D. 
 18. See sources cited supra note 16; infra note 71 (discussing Kaplan’s proposal). 
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Amendment reasonableness calculus.19 The Supreme Court, however, has 
persistently deflected these criticisms, arguing that a jurisprudence that 
considers crime severity would be unworkable.20 Scholars advocating the 
incorporation of crime severity into Fourth Amendment doctrine 
presumably disagree with the Court on this point but have not answered the 
Court’s workability claim. In fact, the existing literature contains little 
analysis of the difficulties of incorporating crime severity into Fourth 
Amendment balancing, and even fewer efforts to find plausible solutions to 
those difficulties.21 
In light of the increasing importance of transsubstantive doctrine in the 
modern era, this Article attempts to answer the workability objection and 
thereby reinvigorate the debate as to the doctrine’s merits. In Part I, it 
explores existing transsubstantive, Fourth Amendment doctrine and 
recognizes the Court’s few deviations from the transsubstantive norm. Part II 
summarizes the surprisingly sparse commentary on this counterintuitive and 
inconsistent jurisprudence, and emphasizes that scholars have failed to 
address the primary justification for transsubstantive doctrine—the 
impracticability of any alternative. In Part III, the Article acknowledges the 
significant obstacles to incorporating crime severity into Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, and proposes a novel framework designed to overcome those 
obstacles. Finally, Part IV illustrates the potential for crime-severity 
considerations to improve Fourth Amendment reasonableness assessments 
and help determine the constitutionality of technologically enhanced 
searches and seizures. 
I. TRANSSUBSTANTIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment speaks plainly, prohibiting “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”22 Yet Supreme Court doctrine ignores one critical 
 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part I.B; infra note 48. 
 21. See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 420 (2003) (arguing that scholars failed 
to help the Supreme Court reach a correct result in Atwater because “[v]ery few writers 
emphasized the importance of offense severity in reasonableness balancing analysis”); Volokh, 
supra note 10, at 1961 (highlighting the potential significance of crime severity in 
constitutional adjudication and noting that “[s]urprisingly, few works have so far discussed this 
matter broadly and systematically”). Apart from a few roughly sketched proposals to limit the 
reach of the exclusionary rule, see infra Part II, the only attempt to demonstrate how a Fourth 
Amendment crime-severity variable could work focuses on the narrow doctrinal question of 
implementing the Supreme Court’s vague directive in Welsh v. Wisconsin. See William A. 
Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations—Warrantless 
Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439 (1990) (discussing 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)); infra Part I.C (discussing Welsh). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Plain does not necessarily mean clear. The second “warrant” 
clause of the Amendment creates ambiguity because it can be viewed as either narrowing or 
expanding the first “reasonableness” clause. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
A1 - BELLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/30/20112:18 PM 
8 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1 
facet of the reasonableness of a search or seizure—the seriousness of the 
crime under investigation. This Part summarizes the Supreme Court’s 
general rejection of crime-severity distinctions in Fourth Amendment case 
law and the Court’s argument that such distinctions are unworkable. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF CRIME-SEVERITY CONSIDERATIONS 
At a sufficient level of abstraction, the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence appears well-suited to crime-severity 
considerations. The Court’s opinions emphasize that the “touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”23 and recognize that even when a 
search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, “reasonableness” remains “the 
overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”24 To implement 
this “central requirement” of reasonableness,25 the Court attempts to strike a 
straightforward “balance between the public interest and the individual’s right 
to personal security.”26 
 
ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 770 (2009). This Article proceeds on the assumption, shared 
by most scholars and the Supreme Court, that the overall command of the Amendment is 
reasonableness, with the warrant clause delineating a specific subset of that command. See 
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 719, 722–24, 
736–38 (2000) (citing James Madison’s original proposed text for the Amendment and 
historical context to argue that its purpose was solely to prohibit general warrants, while 
recognizing that other commentators “almost uniformly” accept “that the change [to Madison’s 
original text] was intended to create a reasonableness standard for warrantless intrusions”); 
CUDDIHY, supra, at 695 (arguing that even the original language proposed by Madison was 
intended to broadly prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures: Madison’s original “meaning 
. . . was not that general warrants were forbidden while other violations . . . were tolerable, but 
that only one of many forbidden violations, the general warrant, had been sufficiently egregious 
to require mention”); infra Part I.A. 
 23. See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (per curiam) (“[T]he ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment, we have often said, is reasonableness.” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 
(2006) (same); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (same); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (“‘[R]easonableness’ . . . is the touchstone of the 
constitutionality of a governmental search.”); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 
(2001) (same); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (stating that the “central 
requirement” of the Fourth Amendment “is one of reasonableness” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Frase, supra note 21, at 375 (“The Court has stated many times that ‘reasonableness 
in all the circumstances’ is the ‘touchstone’ of Fourth Amendment analysis.”); Christopher 
Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 70 (1991) (describing that 
case law establishes as the “most fundamental guideline . . . in determining whether a search or 
seizure is ‘reasonable’” that “competing state and individual interests must be balanced”). 
 24. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559–60 (1978); see United States v. Torres, 
751 F.2d 875, 882–83 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
 25. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330. 
 26. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 118–19 (2001) (“[R]easonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting 
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The Court’s emphasis on “the public interest” as a key Fourth 
Amendment variable suggests that crime severity should play an important 
role in Fourth Amendment analysis. The public’s interest in any search or 
seizure surely depends to some degree on the seriousness of the crime 
under investigation. Indeed, the close relationship between reasonableness, 
the public interest, and crime severity can be found in the common-sense 
judgments of “our daily lives,”27 popular-opinion surveys,28 pronouncements 
of political actors (including statutes that limit search and seizure authority 
based on crime severity),29 scholarly commentary,30 and even judicial 
opinions31 with little, if any, dissent. Crime-severity distinctions also conform 
nicely to the historical antecedents of the Fourth Amendment. The Justices 
themselves occasionally note the integral role crime-severity distinctions 
 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) 
(“We have described ‘the balancing of competing interests’ as ‘the key principle of the Fourth 
Amendment.’” (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981))); T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965 (1987); Frase, supra 
note 21, at 348–49 (chronicling the development of general reasonableness balancing in 
Supreme Court case law). 
 27. Volokh, supra note 10, at 1965 (“[I]n our daily lives we judge the reasonableness of a 
reaction partly based on the harm that it aims to avoid [and i]t seems appealing to have 
constitutional law do likewise.”). 
 28. See Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and 
Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1598 (2010) (recognizing that in opinion surveys, “the 
seriousness of the crime under investigation correlated inversely with intrusiveness ratings,” i.e., 
people more readily accept privacy intrusions that target more serious crimes). 
 29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 2516 (2006) (limiting authority of prosecutors to intercept wire or 
oral communications to investigations of serious crimes); id. § 3142 (setting forth 
considerations for holding suspects on bail based, in part, on crime severity). For 
pronouncements of political actors, see supra Introduction. 
 30. See Amar, supra note 12, at 802 (“It clearly states a global truth that makes intuitive 
sense to police officials and citizens alike: serious crimes and serious needs can justify more 
serious searches and seizures.”); Volokh, supra note 10, at 1965. 
 31. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 380 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (“The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the 
reasonableness of school searches is almost too clear for argument.”); United States v. Torres, 
751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984); infra Part II. 
A similar intuition is recognized in many foreign jurisdictions. See Craig M. Bradley, The 
Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1041 (1983) (discussing German example 
where courts require that “the methods used in fighting crime must be proportional to the 
‘seriousness of the offense and the strength of the suspicion’” (quoting T. KLEINKNECHT, 
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG ¶ 19 (33d ed. 1977))); Yves-Marie Morissette, The Exclusion of Evidence 
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What To Do and What Not To Do, 29 MCGILL 
L.J. 521, 528–30, 554 (1984) (discussing consideration of seriousness of offense in related 
contexts in the courts of Scotland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Germany and noting 
that a recognition of the salience of weighing the “triviality of the offense investigated” against 
any contested privacy intrusion “pervades continental European administrative law”); Peter P. 
Swire, Proportionality for High-Tech Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 751, 760 (2009) (suggesting 
that American jurisprudence would benefit from more “engagement” with the proportionality 
doctrines applied in other jurisdictions, including Canada, Germany, the European Court of 
Human Rights, India, Ireland, and South Africa). 
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played in common-law limits on government seizure authority.32 As Thomas 
Davies explains, at the time of this nation’s founding: 
Warrantless-arrest authority was much broader for accusations of 
felon[ies]. . . than for accusations of less-serious offenses. The 
reasons are apparent: It was most important for public safety to 
catch and punish the potentially dangerous criminals who 
committed the set of very serious and often violent crimes denoted 
as felonies . . . .33 
Yet, for reasons that are never satisfactorily explained, the Supreme 
Court’s evaluation of the public interest in the Fourth Amendment context 
does not entail any assessment of crime severity. Instead, the public interest 
 
 32. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1985) (recognizing as “the common-law 
rule” and the “prevailing rule at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment” that an 
officer could “use . . . whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, though 
not a misdemeanant”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 616 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) 
(“At common law, absent exigent circumstances, entries to arrest could be made only for 
felony.”). 
 33. Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard 
Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
2010, at 1, 12 [hereinafter Davies, Post-Framing Adoption]; see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of 
Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1286 (2010) (describing common-law rule that 
“authorized private homes to be searched for felons on hue and cry, merely upon suspicion”). 
Although it has not decided the question, the Court suggested in Atwater that the common-law 
in-the-presence requirement for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest is not a constitutional 
requirement. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.11 (2001) (stating that it was 
not deciding the question, while simultaneously citing Justice White’s statement in Welsh that 
the requirement “is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment” (internal quotation mark 
omitted)); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of 
the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 239, 383 (2002) (stating that the Atwater footnote “strongly suggests that the majority 
justices are unwilling to treat the committed-in-the-presence-of standard as a constitutional 
requirement for misdemeanor arrests”). 
Davies ascribes the movement toward allowing broad search and seizure authority for 
misdemeanor offenses in the United States to the necessities of enforcing prohibition laws, 
which “were often misdemeanors.” Davies, Post-Framing Adoption, supra, at 54. As Davies notes, so 
much has changed since the founding that it may be impossible to return to the common law’s 
understanding of governmental search and seizure authority. Id. at 67. It may also be 
unwarranted as a purely interpretive matter. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 13 (stating that the 
Amendment “has not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement practices that 
existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s passage” (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 591 n.33) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment, more than many other parts of the 
Constitution, appears to require a fairly high level of abstraction of purpose; its use of the term 
‘reasonable’ (actually, ‘unreasonable’) positively invites constructions that change with 
changing circumstances.”); cf. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical 
Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1997) (criticizing the Court for its inconsistent use of history 
in interpreting Fourth Amendment reasonableness). For a discussion of common-law felonies, 
see Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 90–91 
(2004) (explaining that the term felony “originally referred simply to vicious acts” but greatly 
expanded over the eighteenth century). 
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is measured by the quantum of suspicion that a suspect has committed a 
crime—any crime.34 Under existing doctrine, the public interest is somehow 
just as compelling when the police are investigating an alleged shoplifting as 
an alleged murder. 
Fourth Amendment doctrine’s transsubstantive nature is so deeply 
engrained that it most commonly operates by omission. In the vast majority 
of cases, the Supreme Court, and thus lower courts, simply ignore the 
underlying crime in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. For 
example, in Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court recently clarified the Fourth 
Amendment parameters of a vehicle search.35 Neither the majority nor the 
dissenting opinions suggested that the seriousness of the underlying 
offense—in Gant, the misdemeanor offense of driving without a license36—
should play any role in assessing the reasonableness of such searches. 
The various overarching verbal formulations that govern Fourth 
Amendment doctrine similarly ignore the wide variance in the public 
interest in solving different crimes. To detain (or arrest) a suspect, a police 
officer must have a reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) that “criminal 
activity is afoot.”37 A search is permitted if “the known facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the 
belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”38 When a 
 
 34. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (“To be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”); 
Ohm, supra note 16, at 1555 (“Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law . . . has always treated 
probable cause as the principle tool for balancing privacy and security.”); cf. Torres, 751 F.2d at 
882 (“The usual way in which judges interpreting the Fourth Amendment take account of the 
fact that searches vary in the degree to which they invade personal privacy is by requiring a 
higher degree of probable cause (to believe that the search will yield incriminating evidence), 
and by being more insistent that a warrant be obtained . . . .”). 
 35. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
permits “an officer to conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of 
the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest”). 
 36. Id. at 1715 (describing lower court’s ruling “that the police saw Gant commit the 
crime of driving without a license and . . . that the [disputed vehicle] search was permissible as a 
search incident to arrest”); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3473(A) (2011) (classifying offense of 
driving without a license as “a class 1 misdemeanor”). 
 37. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (emphasis added) (explaining that 
police may detain an individual based on “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot”); cf. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“A warrantless arrest of an 
individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, 
is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause.”); Garner, 
471 U.S. at 7 (“A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that 
person committed a crime.”). 
 38. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (emphasis added) (describing 
“reasonable suspicion” as “‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person 
stopped of criminal activity” and “probable cause to search as existing where the known facts 
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417–18 (1981))). 
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warrant is required, the standard is the same, but a magistrate must first 
agree that “given all the circumstances” there is “a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”39 
The Court occasionally underlines the general absence of a crime-
severity variable from its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by explicitly 
rejecting crime severity as a relevant consideration. In Mincey v. Arizona, the 
Justices unanimously upbraided an Arizona state court for permitting 
warrantless searches of homicide crime scenes.40 The Supreme Court 
explained that, absent exigent circumstances, Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” requires a warrant prior to a home search, and “the 
seriousness of the offense under investigation” does not “create[] exigent 
circumstances” that would “justify a warrantless search.”41 Six years later, 
when state courts in Louisiana did not appear to get this message, a still-
unanimous Court reaffirmed Mincey’s holding.42 
The Supreme Court applied the principle invoked in Mincey to the 
opposite end of the crime spectrum in the more recent cases of Whren v. 
United States43 and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.44 In Whren, the Court declined 
to limit the permissible scope of searches or seizures where the sole 
legitimate government interest implicated was a minor traffic infraction.45 In 
Atwater, the Court upheld, as constitutionally reasonable, a custodial arrest 
for a nonjailable, seatbelt violation.46 The Atwater majority squarely rejected 
the argument that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness command 
dictated a more limited arrest (i.e., seizure) authority for a minor, 
nonjailable offense.47 
 
 39. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 
41(d)(1) (“After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge—or if 
authorized by Rule 41(b), a judge of a state court of record—must issue the warrant if there is 
probable cause to search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking 
device.”); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008) (explaining the rule “that officers 
may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests” applies to “any ‘lawful 
arrest’” (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973))). 
 40. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). Justice Rehnquist agreed with the holding 
discussed here, making that holding unanimous. See id. at 406 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 394; cf. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.6(e), at 223 (“Some courts for years 
recognized an exception to the general rule that a search warrant is needed to search premises 
for evidence, namely, that police could enter without a warrant to conduct an investigation at 
the scene of a possible homicide.”). 
 42. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21 (1984) (reversing Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
holding that detectives could perform warrantless search of home where homicide victim was 
discovered). 
 43. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 44. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 45. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. 
 46. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. 
 47. Id. (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even 
a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth 
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In sum, despite its purported focus on the “public interest” served by a 
given search or seizure, the Court refuses to incorporate a significant 
determinant of the public interest—offense severity—into Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. Apart from a few, isolated circumstances, discussed 
below, the Court’s doctrine parts way with the common understanding of 
“reasonableness” by neither imposing additional limits on searches or 
seizures aimed at minor offenses, nor affording greater latitude in 
investigations of the most serious crimes, such as murder. 
B. THE WORKABILITY JUSTIFICATION 
The Supreme Court rarely tries to explain the omission of crime 
severity from the Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculus. For the most 
part, the Court simply passes over the common-sense intuition that the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure is connected to the seriousness of the 
crime being investigated. In the few cases where the Court explicitly rejects 
calls to consider offense severity, however, its emphasis has been on 
administrability.48 
 In rejecting the Arizona courts’ limited homicide exception to the 
warrant requirement in Mincey, the Court proclaimed that there was no 
principled Fourth Amendment distinction between “extremely serious 
crime[s],” such as murder, and less serious crime.49 The Court explained: “If 
the warrantless search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the 
warrantless search of the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a burglary? ‘No 
 
Amendment, arrest the offender.”); Craig Bradley, The Middle Class Fourth Amendment, 6 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1138 n.69 (2003) (stating that, in Atwater, “the Court continued its 
insistence that Fourth Amendment law, i.e., the reasonableness of a given search or seizure, 
does not depend on the nature or seriousness of the crime being investigated”); Davies, Post-
Framing Adoption, supra note 33, at 64 (arguing that the majority “ran roughshod over the 
historical limitation of less-than-felony warrantless arrests to ‘breaches of the peace’”); cf. Wayne 
A. Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O’Connor’s Dissent in Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 79 MISS. L.J. 115, 129 (2010) (noting that “state and lower federal courts condoned 
warrantless arrests, and searches incident thereto, for myriad minor auto and non-auto related 
offenses” and listing offenses with citations). 
 48. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1660 (1998) (“The Court has chosen to stay out of the area of substance 
in evaluating most searches and seizures partly because of the subjectivity that seems to be an 
inevitable component of nonquantitative reasonableness analysis.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Being 
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 849 n.145 (2004) (stating that the 
Court’s “concern for the administrability of a rule against warrantless arrests for nonjailable 
offenses may be of a piece with the more general phenomenon that Professor Stuntz has 
criticized: the absence of proportionality between investigative methods regulated under the 
Fourth Amendment and the seriousness of the crime involved”); Kaplan, supra note 12, at 1047 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never adopted Justice Jackson’s view, presumably because such a 
rule would raise grave problems of administrability.”); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (“The real 
reason for transsubstantive law is practicality, the fear that taking substance into account when 
authorizing searches or subpoenas will be unmanageable.”). 
 49. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). 
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consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of 
rational limitation’ of such a doctrine.”50 The unanimous Whren Court 
similarly claimed that there was “no principle” that would enable the Court 
to distinguish serious criminal laws from those that are “so commonly 
violated” or not “sufficiently important to merit enforcement.”51 The 
workability justification resurfaced in Atwater where the Court noted that 
“complications arise the moment we begin to think about” potential 
mechanisms “for drawing a line between minor crimes with limited [Fourth 
Amendment] arrest authority and others not so restricted.”52 The Justices’ 
administrability concerns are echoed by commentators, such as Christopher 
Slobogin, who argue that “basing any search and seizure rule on a severity of 
crime factor” will be plagued by the “difficulty of discerning which crimes 
are ‘minor’ and which are ‘serious.’”53 Slobogin adds that “even if a useable 
definition of crime magnitude is devised, its application may be impossible, 
given the realities of law enforcement; activity which appears to be a ‘minor’ 
crime at one point may well be, or become, ‘serious’ and vice versa.”54 
While daunting in some respects, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the 
purported impracticability of incorporating crime severity into Fourth 
Amendment doctrine has a positive side for those dissatisfied with the status 
quo. It hints at an implicit recognition of the absence of stronger 
 
 50. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969)). 
 51. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996). 
 52. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348. 
 53. Slobogin, supra note 23, at 32 n.109; see Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic 
Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 810–11 (2004) (arguing that tailoring 
Fourth Amendment protections to offense gravity “would be wholly unworkable for police in 
the field in the first instance and for magistrates issuing warrants and for reviewing courts”); 
Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 786 (2002) (arguing that “[a] sliding scale 
approach” to Fourth Amendment doctrine “presents a variety of administrative and practical 
problems” and detailing problems); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.6(a), at 216 & n.9 
(criticizing Welsh by stating that the dissent “correctly observed that the Court’s approach will 
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes, a difficult task for 
which officers and courts are poorly equipped” (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 54. Slobogin, supra note 23, at 32 n.109; Volokh, supra note 10, at 1983 (stating that while 
“[w]e may all agree that there is a difference between murder and littering,” it does not 
necessarily “follow that courts can create administrable lines that distinguish the various cases 
between the two extremes”). Slobogin fleshes out his critique in a footnote, stating: 
At what point does an offense become so serious that police no longer need 
probable cause to search a house? Should the dividing line be between felonies 
and misdemeanors, between offenses that are considered ‘harmful’ and those that 
are not, or should it vary from case to case, depending more on the nature of the 
criminal act rather than the technical offense committed? And how does one apply 
whatever standard is appropriate in cases where it is not known what crime has 
been committed? 
Slobogin, supra note 23, at 51 n.173. 
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objections.55 After all, the Fourth Amendment demands reasonableness, and 
in common parlance (as well as common-law tradition), the reasonableness 
of a search or seizure depends a great deal on the severity of the offense 
being investigated.56 Indeed, as the next section explains, the force of this 
intuition is so strong that even the Supreme Court is occasionally unable to 
resist it. 
C. EXCEPTIONS TO TRANSSUBSTANTIVE DOCTRINE 
A few exceptions to transsubstantive Fourth Amendment doctrine exist, 
with the most acute arising from the case of Welsh v. Wisconsin.57 While 
 
 55. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (arguing that “no obvious principle requires 
transsubstantive Fourth Amendment law”); cf. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) 
(acknowledging that “[i]n Atwater, we acknowledged that nuanced judgments about the need 
for warrantless arrest were desirable,” but the Court nonetheless declined to permit them). 
Slobogin raises another objection by analogy to other areas of constitutional criminal 
procedure where protections do not vary based on crime severity. See Slobogin, supra note 23, at 
52 (arguing that the transsubstantive nature of criminal-procedure rules generally “supports a 
common-sense intuition: that differences in individual protections against government 
intervention should usually flow from differences in the consequences of the intervention, not 
from the nature of the crime”); see also Luna, supra note 53, at 785 (“[T]he fact that a given 
crime is viewed as serious or harmful does not allow the state to circumvent or even relax other 
constitutional rights, such as the reasonable doubt standard or the right to trial by jury.”). The 
analogy is flawed, however, because in most criminal-procedure contexts, any offense-gravity-
based increase in the government’s interest in conviction is offset by a countervailing 
consideration: the innocent defendant’s interest in avoiding a more serious conviction. This 
mirror image of countervailing interests is largely absent in the Fourth Amendment context. See 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 760 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (“A warrantless home 
entry to arrest is no more intrusive when the crime is ‘minor’ than when the suspect is sought in 
connection with a serious felony.”); Volokh, supra note 10, at 1964 & n.20. One could argue 
that a guilty defendant’s interest in avoiding detection increases as the severity of the crime 
investigated increases, but the law (properly) does not consider a desire to conceal guilt as a 
legitimate privacy interest. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005) 
(explaining that “[w]e have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed 
‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest’” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 
123 (1984))); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to 
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1349 (2002). Other objections could be 
raised, such as that vigorous and intrusive prosecutions of minor crimes may be reasonable for 
the counterintuitive reason that such prosecutions lead to a decrease in serious crime. See Dan 
M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997) 
(arguing that “[c]racking down on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, open gang activity and 
other visible signs of disorder may be justifiable” under “social influence conception of 
deterrence” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 56. See supra note 30. 
 57. Welsh, 466 U.S. 740; see also Colb, supra note 48, at 1682–83 (“The Court in Welsh did 
something it has usually refused to do: It took note of both the gravity of the offense in question 
(a ‘minor offense’) and the intrusiveness of the particular search (a person’s home, at night).”); 
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 847 n.16 (noting Welsh as one of “a few famous exceptions” to the 
courts’ ostensible indifference to crime severity, “famous precisely because they are 
exceptional”). 
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anomalous, Welsh informs the analysis in two ways. First, it undercuts the 
Court’s claim in related Fourth Amendment contexts that offense severity is 
an unworkable consideration. Second, and relatedly, Welsh highlights the 
Court’s failure to grapple with the complex issues involved in crime-severity 
analysis and thus the importance, even if current case law remains 
unchanged, of addressing these issues in a comprehensive manner. 
In Welsh, the Court rejected, as unconstitutional, the entry of a home 
without a warrant despite the presence of an exigent circumstance (the 
imminent dissipation of evidence).58 It reached this conclusion, in part, 
because “the underlying offense for which there [wa]s probable cause to 
arrest”—drunk driving—was “relatively minor.”59 The Welsh majority looked 
exclusively to the state legislature’s classification of the offense—“a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is 
possible”—to reach its conclusion that drunk driving is a minor offense.60 
This approach, it explained, constituted the best way to evaluate offense 
severity as it “can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced 
with a decision to arrest.”61 Apart from this sentiment, the opinion makes no 
effort to guide lower courts in ranking the relative severity of more typical 
(i.e., jailable) crimes, and fails to address any of the other questions 
inherent in a jurisprudence that depends upon crime-severity distinctions.62 
The Supreme Court also recognizes offense-severity distinctions in 
excessive force, “seizure” cases. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court deemed an 
officer’s use of deadly force to stop a fleeing, unarmed burglar 
“unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.63 The majority explained 
that a seizure by deadly force is reasonable only in response to a threat of 
physical harm, or if “there is probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has 
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm.”64 The Court later confirmed that, under Garner, 
 
 58. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753–54. 
 59. Id. at 750 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
 60. Id. at 754. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Schroeder, supra note 21, at 558 (advocating more concrete guidance for lower 
courts attempting to implement the holding of Welsh); infra Part III. 
 63. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“A police officer may not seize an 
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”). 
 64. Id. at 11. Garner’s explicit allowance for the use of deadly force based on past, rather 
than present, dangerousness, is at odds with other parts of the opinion that stress the 
importance of present dangerousness. Nevertheless, in a later case, the Court rejected an effort 
to render this language superfluous, explaining that “[t]he necessity described in Garner was, in 
fact, the need to prevent ‘serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others’” and that 
“Garner hypothesized that deadly force may be used ‘if necessary to prevent escape’ when the 
suspect is known to have ‘committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of 
serious physical harm,’ so that his mere being at large poses an inherent danger to society.” 
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determining “reasonableness” in this context “requires careful attention to 
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of 
the crime at issue.”65 Thus, as in Welsh, the Garner Court recognized a Fourth 
Amendment distinction between more and less serious crimes, and held that 
only in circumstances involving the former category would certain 
government actions be deemed reasonable. Unlike Welsh, however, the 
Garner Court did not look to legislative classifications to determine relative 
seriousness. Instead, the Court appealed to an intuitive violent–nonviolent 
distinction.66 
D. SUMMARY 
As the preceding discussion reveals, the case law stands in a state of 
confusion. The bulk of Fourth Amendment doctrine is transsubstantive, 
either by virtue of the Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of crime severity as 
a valid Fourth Amendment consideration, or the Court’s pointed omission 
of that consideration from its analysis. To the extent the Court provides any 
justification for this counterintuitive omission, it is that offense-severity 
distinctions are unworkable in the Fourth Amendment context. This 
explanation is belied by Welsh and Garner, where the Court explicitly, but 
inconsistently and with little analysis, requires police officers and courts to 
assess Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in part, by evaluating the 
seriousness of the underlying offense. 
 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 n.9 (2007) (citation omitted) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 
11). 
 65. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 66. In at least two other contexts, the Supreme Court hinted, without deciding, that 
offense severity might factor into Fourth Amendment reasonableness. See United States v. 
Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37 n.4 (2003) (suggesting, without deciding, that there might be a 
distinction with respect to reasonableness of no-knock entry “when the reason for the search is 
a minor offense”); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 223–24, 229 (1985) (upholding 
Terry stop of a person suspected of being the getaway driver in a twelve-day-old, armed robbery 
as reasonable, “[p]articularly in the context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public 
safety,” but hedging that: “We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to 
investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted”). In the wake of Hensley, lower courts 
diverge on the question left open by the high court, with some courts deeming there to be a 
rough dividing line between serious and minor crimes demarcated by the pertinent 
jurisdiction’s (sometimes obscure) line between felony and misdemeanor offenses. See Rachel S. 
Weiss, Note, Defining the Contours of United States v. Hensley: Limiting the Use of Terry Stops for 
Completed Misdemeanors, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1321, 1335 & n.109 (2009). Lower courts also 
incorporate offense seriousness into the reasonableness calculation in contexts not yet 
condoned by the Supreme Court. See Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless strip searches of 
prisoners arrested “for minor offenses”), overruled by Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 
F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 
296, 299 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011) (noting Ninth Circuit’s reversal of 
Giles and the circuit split with respect to reasonableness of suspicionless strip searches of 
prisoners); Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 
IND. L.J. 419, 461 & n.270. 
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II. CALLS TO ALTER THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE STATUS QUO 
Given the intuitive appeal of incorporating offense gravity into Fourth 
Amendment “reasonableness,” it is no surprise that there have long been 
critics of transsubstantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. Justice Jackson 
initiated this chorus in a 1949 case where the Supreme Court applied the 
then-evolving “automobile exception”67 to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement. Unconvinced that Fourth Amendment protections should 
hinge on the distinction between automobiles and homes, Justice Jackson 
opined that “if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
. . . it seems to me they should depend [instead] . . . upon the gravity of the 
offense.”68 Justice Jackson argued that such distinctions would reflect that 
judges should “strive hard[er] to sustain” a questionable search for a 
kidnapped child than a similar search for a suspected “bootlegger.”69 
Justice Jackson’s dissent foreshadowed a smattering of academic calls 
for offense-severity-based distinctions in Fourth Amendment doctrine. In 
one of the earliest, John Kaplan advocated an exception to the application 
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “in the most serious cases.”70 
Under this approach, Fourth Amendment protections remain unchanged, 
but the remedy of exclusion applies only in prosecutions of less serious 
crimes.71 Kaplan’s approach, by sending an indirect signal to police officers, 
tracks modern suggestions that the courts should allow government agents 
greater leeway in investigating particularly dangerous offenses, such as  
 
 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1087 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing 
the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement). 
 68. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id.; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 70. Kaplan, supra note 12, at 1046 (proposing exception to the exclusionary rule “in the 
most serious cases—treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping by organized 
groups” with the caveat “that evidence would be suppressed if the violation of civil liberties were 
shocking enough”). 
 71. Kaplan argues that his proposal would protect the exclusionary rule from popular 
hostility and allow courts to more “fully and honestly” interpret the Fourth Amendment, 
“[f]reed of the concern that the fourth amendment [sic] doctrine they announce would later 
result in the release of people guilty of the most serious crimes.” Id. at 1047. Yale Kamisar and 
others criticize proposals like Kaplan’s on the ground that they lead inevitably to dilution of the 
already meager Fourth Amendment protections, particularly as any list of “serious crimes” 
would inevitably grow to include numerous offenses, including those that most frequently 
occasion unreasonable searches—drug offenses. Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and 
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Luna, supra note 53, at 782–87 (echoing and supplementing Kamisar’s criticisms of 
“sliding scale approaches to the Fourth Amendment”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.1(c), at 
132 (criticizing proposals to limit the reach of the exclusionary rule). 
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terrorism.72 In fact, prior to federalization of the exclusionary rule in 1961,73 
Maryland enacted an extreme form of the system that Kaplan would later 
propose—providing that evidence obtained in an illegal search could be 
admitted in any felony trial.74 
More recently, commentators, including William Stuntz and Sheryl 
Colb, advocate incorporating offense gravity directly into Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness assessments.75 Stuntz suggests separating 
offenses into discrete categories and crafting “more forgiving [Fourth 
Amendment] rules for more serious crimes and tougher rules for less 
 
 72. Frase, supra note 21, at 417 (“It seems inevitable that the Court will be presented with 
one or more cases in which the police request additional investigative authority to deal with 
terrorism or other threats of catastrophic harm.”); Gould & Stern, supra note 53, at 778 
(arguing that Fourth Amendment doctrine should be altered to ensure that law enforcement 
may lawfully conduct a mass search to locate a hidden nuclear bomb); Stuntz, supra note 9, at 
2141–42, 2188–89 (arguing that “there is nothing new about, and nothing wrong with, the 
claim that after September 11 law enforcement authority should increase” and proposing as 
part of a “grand trade” that law enforcement be provided additional constitutional leeway 
investigating terrorists). Even with exclusion off the table, milder disincentives to 
unconstitutional searches and seizures would presumably remain, such as civil liability under 28 
U.S.C. § 1983. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242–43 (2009). 
 73. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in 
the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 76–77 (1992) (explaining that, although the 
exclusionary rule was introduced by the Supreme Court in the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), its application was limited to federal prosecutions until the 1961 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). 
 74. See Delnegro v. State, 81 A.2d 241, 244 (Md. 1951) (citing Bouse Act, ch. 194, § 1, 
1929 Md. Laws 533, 533–34 (repealed 1996)). The Maryland statute was later amended to also 
preclude application of the exclusionary rule in prosecutions of misdemeanor gambling 
offenses in certain counties. Salsburg v. State, 94 A.2d 280, 281 (Md. 1953), aff’d, 346 U.S. 545 
(1954). 
 75. See Colb, supra note 48, at 1642; Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (arguing that the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness command implies a consideration of the “government need” for 
certain investigative techniques, and “[a] large factor in government need—perhaps the 
largest—is the crime the government is investigating”). Other commentators echo these calls 
for offense-specific Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 12, at 802, 804 
(arguing that Courts should be “fixed on reasonableness as the polestar of the Fourth 
Amendment” and noting offense severity as one of the possible factors to be considered in 
determining reasonableness); Arcila, supra note 33, at 1339 (suggesting series of guidelines for 
Fourth Amendment doctrine that includes “proportionality,” a concept defined, in part, based 
on “the degree of harm to be avoided or investigated”); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth 
Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 53, 74 (advocating a cost–benefit analysis of searches to 
determine constitutional reasonableness, enforced exclusively by tort remedies, and noting that 
a factor in weighing the benefits of a search is the “gravity of the crime”). For example, Wesley 
Oliver echoes Kaplan’s call for an exception to the exclusionary rule for serious crimes, but 
calls on the legislature to define the crimes effected, and limits this exception to “good faith” 
Fourth Amendment violations. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of the 
Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 241, 246 (2005); see also 
Schroeder, supra note 21, at 557–58 (advocating that a bright-line rule be established barring 
warrantless home entries in investigations of all misdemeanor—as opposed to felony—offenses, 
and also suggesting differential Fourth Amendment treatment for “apocalyptic” crimes). 
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serious crimes.”76 Colb advocates, more generally, that courts should engage 
in comprehensive Fourth Amendment balancing that includes a “weighing 
of the gravity of the crime or crimes defined in the law being enforced, 
against the invasiveness of the proposed government intrusion.”77 
Unlike Kaplan’s approach which, as with any analogous tailoring of the 
exclusionary rule, alters existing doctrine solely by easing limits on 
prosecutions of serious crime, the reforms advocated by Colb and Stuntz 
also enhance constitutional limits on investigations of minor crimes.78 
Currently valid searches and seizures would become unconstitutional due, in 
part, to the relative insignificance of the targeted offense.79 Given that 
investigations of minor offenses such as traffic violations and drug possession 
constitute a substantial portion of police–citizen interactions,80 limits on 
 
 76. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870. 
 77. Colb, supra note 48, at 1647. Colb’s proposal “would result in a finding that the Court 
either should or should not apply a substantively more demanding standard (or even, in theory, 
an absolute prohibition) to such intrusions.” Id. Echoing the tenor of Colb’s view, Slobogin 
proposes a doctrinal framework based upon the idea that “the justification for a government 
search or seizure ought to be roughly proportionate to the invasiveness of the search or 
seizure.” Slobogin, supra note 28, at 1588. Slobogin focuses only on one side of the 
reasonableness balance, however, and particularly “an assessment of intrusiveness” of the 
search, which, he argues, should be determined with reference to public opinion. Id. at 1594, 
1608 (arguing that “crucial to application of the proportionality principle that I propose . . . is 
an assessment of intrusiveness;” “the government’s justification for a search or seizure must be 
roughly proportionate to its intrusiveness, and . . . the justification inquiry focuses on how 
certain police are about whether the search or seizure will produce the evidence they seek”); see 
also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 39 (2007) (discussing the government-interest side of the equation with 
reference to the degree of certainty that a suspect committed a crime). 
 78. See Frase, supra note 21, at 417 (emphasizing that offense-specific Fourth Amendment 
doctrine should not be a “one way street” (quoting Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 465 
(1974) (internal quotation mark omitted)), and if Courts grant police greater authority to 
investigate serious crimes they “will face increased pressure to impose additional limitations on 
police powers in very minor cases”). As part of a proposed “grand trade,” Stuntz also advocates a 
crime-conscious Fourth Amendment doctrine that attempts to limit certain types of secret, 
invasive searches to “the investigation of violent felonies” by “bar[ring] the use of . . . evidence” 
obtained in those searches “to prove other, lesser crimes.” Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2184. This 
proposal appears, like Kaplan’s, to focus on the charged crime, rather than the crime under 
investigation. 
 79. Colb, supra note 48, at 1645 (emphasizing the ability of proposed approach to 
improve upon current doctrine by “address[ing] the potential for disproportionality between 
searches otherwise supported by probable cause and a warrant when the crime at issue is 
relatively minor”); Frase, supra note 21, at 394 (“In very minor cases, the proportionality 
principle can operate as a trump, as it did in Welsh v. Wisconsin.”). 
 80. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 3 tbl.3 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf (reporting on survey indicating that 40.9% of police–
citizen contacts involved a stop of respondent for a traffic infraction, while 2.8% arose because 
the person was suspected of other wrongdoing by police); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 204, 206 tbls.320 & 324 (2011) (listing arrest 
offenses in 2008, including 430.4 drug-possession arrests per every 100,000 U.S. inhabitants); 
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police conduct in such investigations would result in fewer searches and 
seizures, and many of those spared would be poor or members of racial 
minorities.81 These proposals resonate with criticisms of Atwater and Whren as 
insensitive both to the constitutional command that searches and seizures be 
“reasonable,” and to modern concerns about racial profiling, police 
coercion, and community resentment.82 
The most striking aspect of the literature analyzing the omission of 
crime severity from Fourth Amendment balancing, however, is how little 
exists.83 Moreover, the few commentators who squarely address the subject 
sketch in exceedingly broad strokes, ultimately failing to address the 
Supreme Court’s administrability concern.84 And this, after all, is the most 
challenging aspect of the problem. As Eugene Volokh explains, 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep’t of Justice, Key Facts at a Glance, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, http:// 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/drugtab.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (reporting 
1,645,500 drug arrests for adults and 195,700 for juveniles in 2007). 
 81. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RACIAL DISPARITY IN NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS 
3–5 (2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/reports/Report_CCR_NYPD_Stop_and_ 
Frisk.pdf (describing disproportionate impact of NYPD stop-and-frisk policy on minorities); 
DUROSE ET AL., supra note 80, at 3 tbl.5 (noting race of individuals stopped for traffic 
violations); Frase, supra note 21, at 333 (arguing that in the wake of decisions like Atwater, “the 
extremely broad arrest and search powers now enjoyed by the police will be applied in a highly 
selective manner, thus virtually ensuring even more frequent complaints of racial profiling and 
other forms of disparity”); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 854–55, 871–75 (arguing that crime-severity 
distinctions would reduce the likelihood of discriminatory law enforcement because broad 
substantive criminal law, such as the traffic code, gives police “probable cause to arrest anyone 
they want[]”); Ailsa Chang, Alleged Illegal Searches by NYPD May Be Increasing Marijuana Arrests, 
WNYC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2011/apr/26/ 
marijuana-arrests (reporting on high volume of marijuana possession arrests—140 people a 
day—in New York City and suggesting that aggressive police enforcement of marijuana 
possession laws disproportionately result in searches of minorities). 
 82. Atwater and Whren have been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Diana Roberto Donahoe, 
“Could Have,” “Would Have:” What the Supreme Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United 
States, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (1997) (noting that given the ubiquity of traffic laws 
and the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren, “[n]o one is free from this abuse of discretion”); 
Frase, supra note 21, at 331 (“The decision in Atwater has been widely criticized, even by 
conservatives, and with good reason.” (footnote omitted)); Logan, supra note 66, at 465–66 
(arguing that Atwater suggests that “reasonableness has been written out of the Fourth 
Amendment” and ignores the implications for “all Americans, who, in contrast to members of 
the Atwater majority, . . . will suffer the brunt of the Court’s cavalier sentiment”); Timothy P. 
O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for 
Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 730 (1998) (arguing that “Whren is a serious 
setback for those interested in the civil liberties of Americans”). 
 83. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 851 (noting that Fourth Amendment doctrine’s 
transsubstantive nature “is almost never questioned”). 
 84. See Volokh, supra note 10, at 1961 (“Surprisingly, few works have so far discussed this 
matter broadly and systematically.”). Schroeder’s proposal for coherently applying Welsh, supra 
note 21, and Oliver’s argument for a limited good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in 
serious cases, supra note 75, are notable exceptions, but both focus on narrow aspects of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
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The value of constitutional severity distinctions in the abstract 
should not be the issue. Here the devil is in the details. If courts 
can’t make the severity distinctions work in practice, then the 
distinctions’ merits in principle are of little consequence. And if 
courts can make the distinctions work in practice, then we might be 
able to live with the distinctions’ theoretical problems.85 
In the end, the existing literature concerning Fourth Amendment 
doctrine’s treatment of crime severity constitutes a fascinating, but 
incomplete and unsatisfying, dialogue. Compelling reasons for 
incorporating crime severity into Fourth Amendment reasonableness coexist 
with compelling, but unaddressed, objections to that course. Particularly as 
crime severity may hold the key to the meaningful application of the Fourth 
Amendment in the modern era, the stagnation of this debate is unfortunate. 
It is long past time for a robust discussion of the specifics of incorporating 
crime severity into Fourth Amendment doctrine, or a frank 
acknowledgement from scholars that no workable mechanism for doing so 
exists. 
III. INCORPORATING CRIME SEVERITY INTO FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
For all its intuitive appeal, incorporating crime-severity distinctions into 
Fourth Amendment doctrine is a challenging endeavor. First, any changes to 
existing doctrine must be amenable to practical application not only by 
lower courts, but also by police officers acting quickly in ambiguous and 
sometimes lethal circumstances. Second, the changes must be supported not 
simply by normative arguments, but by principles of constitutional 
interpretation.86 Guided by these considerations, this Part suggests a novel 
 
 85. Volokh, supra note 10, at 1983; see also Schroeder, supra note 21, at 558 (recognizing 
“the difficulties inherent in finding a viable methodology for distinguishing among and ranking 
offenses”). 
 86. On this second point, the Fourth Amendment’s text is both a blessing and a curse. 
The “reasonableness” command openly invites consideration of a crime-severity variable in 
some form. In addition, the vague constitutional directive provides significant leeway to the 
Supreme Court to define the variable’s contours and should immunize the Court to some 
degree from criticism—at least on constitutional legitimacy grounds—of the choices made. See 
Steiker, supra note 33, at 824 (noting that the Fourth Amendment “appears to require a fairly 
high level of abstraction of purpose; its use of the term ‘reasonable’ (actually, ‘unreasonable’) 
positively invites constructions that change with changing circumstances”); Volokh, supra note 
10, at 1977 (“Perhaps so long as there is a constitutional principle that shows the need to draw 
a line somewhere, courts should feel free to draw such a line even if they can’t give a principled 
reason for the particular place they draw it.”); cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 
(1968) (noting difficulty of line drawing in separating “petty offenses” from those for which a 
jury trial must be provided and stating that “in the absence of an explicit constitutional 
provision, the definitional task necessarily falls on the courts”). At the same time, the absence of 
a more specific constitutional command creates a danger that no matter what course the Court 
pursues, it will appear to be acting on its own policy preferences, particularly if its crime-severity 
characterizations do not mirror those of the legislature. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth 
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analytical and interpretive approach to crafting a Fourth Amendment crime-
severity framework. 
A. IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT CRIME 
Any framework that incorporates crime-severity distinctions into Fourth 
Amendment doctrine requires a threshold mechanism for precisely 
identifying the crime at issue. While often overlooked in the debate over 
constitutional crime-severity distinctions, identifying the relevant crime can 
sometimes be just as difficult as determining its relative severity. 
The first question in this analysis is whether to focus on the crime being 
investigated at the time of the stop and search, or the crime ultimately 
charged. The two offenses are often distinct, and the divergence can be 
extreme.87 If the analysis is, as here, driven by the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness command, the answer is clear. An assessment of the 
reasonableness of an officer’s search or seizure depends on the information 
available to the officer at the time of its initiation.88 Thus, it must be the 
offense suspected or under investigation that informs the Fourth 
Amendment calculus, not the offense ultimately charged (something that 
will often be unknown at the initiation of a search or seizure).89 This 
conclusion appears consistent with the Supreme Court’s truncated forays 
 
Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line 
Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 341 (2004) (highlighting the difficulty the “spacious” language of the 
Fourth Amendment creates for courts: “courts are not supposed to legislate, and yet in this 
instance the plain meaning of the text incorporates norms of reasonableness by reference”). 
 87. For example, Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and serial killer Ted Bundy 
were apprehended after being pulled over for traffic violations. See Official Trial Transcript, 
United States v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 203457, at *12 & *32 (D. Colo. 1997); David A. Sklansky, 
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 
271 n.1. 
 88. See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261–62 (1960) (holding that 
constitutionality of arrest must be determined by what occurred at the time of arrest, and 
“nothing that happened thereafter could make that arrest lawful, or justify a search as its 
incident”); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“We have had frequent occasion 
to point out that a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad 
when it starts and does not change character from its success.” (citation omitted)). 
 89. See Colb, supra note 48, at 1645 (advocating that “Supreme Court doctrine recognize 
that an ‘unreasonable’ search in violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the 
intrusiveness of a search outweighs the gravity of the offense being investigated”); Donald A. 
Dripps, The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: From “Still Preoccupied with 1985” to “Virtual Deterrence,” 
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 760 (2010) (“However one resolves the transsubstantive issue, the 
issue is one of substantive, rather than remedial, law.”); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 851 (“Fourth 
Amendment law can vary its protection based on the nature of the crime police are 
investigating.”). This is not to say that crime-severity distinctions tethered to the charged crime 
would be unsupportable. Rather, the point is that an approach that focused on the charged 
crime is distinct from that proposed here, requiring a different doctrinal grounding (e.g., 
policy-based modifications to the exclusionary rule) and aimed at a different goal—removing 
obstacles to prosecutions of serious crimes. The merits of such a proposal would require careful 
consideration and are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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into Fourth Amendment crime-severity distinctions in both Welsh and 
Garner.90 
The conclusion that the offense under investigation constitutes the 
relevant crime does not end the analysis. Uncertainty as to the crime being 
investigated will often arise from factual ambiguity in the initial report of a 
crime.91 In addition, once crime severity matters to the constitutional 
inquiry, officers could artificially buttress the constitutional reasonableness 
of their actions by overstating the offense under investigation.92 As in other 
areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine, an objective standard can address the 
related concerns of ambiguity and manipulation.93 A Fourth Amendment 
crime-severity variable need not be determined by an officer’s subjective 
state of mind, or influenced by after-the-fact rationalizations. Rather, courts 
could adopt an objective, yet deferential,94 test that focuses on the facts 
known to law enforcement at the time of a search or seizure, much like the 
probable-cause standard under existing law.95 Such a standard (e.g., “the 
most serious offense plausibly suggested by the facts known to the officer”)96 
would lend itself to common-sense application, even in ambiguous 
 
 90. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (determining that the offense the 
officer believed the suspect had committed was not sufficiently dangerous to warrant seizure by 
deadly force); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (deeming “the underlying offense 
for which there is probable cause to arrest” to be minor); cf. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 
221, 229 (1985) (noting possible distinction in reasonableness between stops based on officer’s 
belief that suspect was involved in felony as opposed to misdemeanor offense). 
 91. See Slobogin, supra note 23, at 31–32 n.109; Stuntz, supra note 8, at 870 (noting that 
gradations of protections will create the difficult circumstance where the police and prosecutors 
must “classify cases by crime before the details of the crime are known”). 
 92. Cf. Steiker, supra note 33, at 853 (noting that under current law, “once police officers 
have found incriminating evidence, they have an obvious incentive to perjure themselves in 
order to justify the initial seizure”). 
 93. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 397 (1989) (“As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, . . . the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry 
. . . is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ 
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying 
intent or motivation.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (emphasizing that in assessing 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an 
objective standard”). 
 94. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (“The calculus of reasonableness 
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving . . . .”). 
 95. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.3(b), at 166 (explaining that the “probable cause 
test” is “an objective one; for there to be probable cause, the facts must be such as would 
warrant a belief by a reasonable man”). Where appropriate, the “collective knowledge” doctrine 
imputes the knowledge of other officers to the searching officer. See United States v. Nafzger, 
974 F.2d 906, 912 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing collective-knowledge doctrine). 
 96. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding that deadly force seizures are 
reasonable where “there is probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (holding that a warrantless home entry was unreasonable where “the 
underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest” was minor). 
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circumstances, and counteracts any incentive to speculate as to the existence 
of a more serious crime than the facts support. 
B. THE CASE AGAINST CASE-SPECIFIC SEVERITY DETERMINATIONS 
After identifying the relevant crime, a doctrinal framework that 
incorporates crime-severity distinctions must confront its next significant 
challenge—determining the relative seriousness of that crime. The difficulty 
inherent in crafting a workable crime hierarchy is one of the most 
commonly cited reasons for rejecting Fourth Amendment crime-severity 
distinctions.97 
A tempting response to the difficulty of categorizing offenses is to avoid 
the enterprise altogether, leaving lower courts to make ad hoc, case-by-case 
assessments of offense severity. This is essentially the approach adopted by 
the majority in Welsh,98 with predictable results. Surveying the post-Welsh case 
law, William Schroeder characterizes the lower courts’ crime-severity analysis 
as “arbitrary, freewheeling, and reflective of little more than the intuitive 
reactions of individual judges to particular crimes.”99 The lower courts 
engage “in a process of characterization rather than classification and have 
simply characterized particular offenses as ‘grave,’ ‘serious,’ or ‘minor.’”100 
Examples of the phenomenon Schroeder identifies abound. In Ingram 
v. City of Columbus, the Sixth Circuit characterized as a serious offense a 
defendant’s taking of an undercover narcotics officer’s twenty dollars and 
fleeing into a home.101 In United States v. Schmidt, the Eighth Circuit took a 
similarly dim view of a teenager’s actions during an attempted arrest (on the 
teenager’s lawn) for underage drinking.102The teenager, insisting that the 
officer had no right to be on his property, kicked the officer in the knee and 
fled into his house.103 The Court concluded that the officer’s “hot pursuit” 
home entry (the officer followed the suspect and kicked in his locked front 
door) was reasonable because “[t]he underlying offense here, assault with a 
dangerous weapon” (the teenager’s shoe) “is certainly a serious offense.”104 
 
 97. See Schroeder, supra note 21, at 498; Slobogin, supra note 23, at 31 n.109; Volokh, 
supra note 10, at 1982; supra Part I.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of offense-
severity distinctions); cf. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 76 (1985) (“Rating crimes is ultimately a 
matter of making value judgments, on which persons reasonably may differ.”). 
 98. See supra Part I.C. 
 99. Schroeder, supra note 21, at 497 (citing cases). 
 100. Id. at 494. 
 101. Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 587–88 (6th Cir. 1999) (ruling that the 
police had probable cause to believe the suspect was “engaged in a felony warranting 
imprisonment”—offering to sell cocaine—and, thus, could pursue him into a home without a 
warrant). 
 102. United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1013. 
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The Supreme Court itself engaged in this type of vacuous analysis when 
confronted with a case that appeared analogous to Welsh. In Illinois v. 
McArthur, the Court considered whether the police, suspecting that a man 
had a small amount of marijuana in his trailer home, reasonably barred his 
entry while they obtained a search warrant.105 The Court found no Fourth 
Amendment violation and dismissed comparison to Welsh, in part, on the 
ground that unlike the “minor” offense in Welsh, possession of marijuana (a 
class C misdemeanor under state law) was “‘jailable,’ not ‘nonjailable.’”106 
The post-Welsh jurisprudence summarized above highlights two 
significant problems with case-by-case offense characterization.107 First, such 
ad-hoc characterization is anathema to the principle that Fourth 
Amendment doctrine must be sufficiently concrete that law-enforcement 
officers (and citizens) can predict, in advance, whether a given search or 
seizure is constitutional.108 Second, when looking only at individual cases, 
courts can find almost any offense, in isolation, “serious.”109 This predictable 
reflex misses the point of offense-severity considerations—relative severity. 
The question is not whether a particular crime is serious. (We are, after all, 
talking about criminal laws.) Rather, the pertinent question is whether 
certain crimes are more or less serious than others, thus necessitating, under 
a reasonableness standard, a more or less intrusive police response. 
C. CRAFTING A CRIME HIERARCHY 
The lower courts’ experience implementing Welsh suggests that it is not 
sufficient to leave offense-severity classification to ad-hoc, case-by-case 
judicial assessments. Guideposts must be erected to ensure predictability for 
citizens and police officers, create consistency throughout the lower courts, 
and decrease the temptation to reflexively label all criminal offenses 
“serious.” In short, a workable Fourth Amendment framework that 
incorporates offense severity must categorize offenses. 
 
 105. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001). 
 106. Id. at 336. The offense could be punished by up to thirty days in jail. Id. 
 107. See Volokh, supra note 10, at 1977–79 (highlighting similar difficulties with a doctrinal 
framework that evaluates crime severity on a case-by-case basis). The debate summarized above 
reflects the familiar tensions between rules and standards. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
 108. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (“[T]he protection of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules 
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to 
whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’”), abrogated on 
other grounds by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 109. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 97, at 74 (“An explicit seriousness scale helps compel the 
rulemaker to consider whether its proposed penalties comport with its judgment of the 
comparative gravity of offenses.”); Kamisar, supra note 71, at 26 (emphasizing inevitable 
pressure on courts to expand any list defining “serious crimes” for which law enforcement was 
permitted greater leeway in its investigations); Luna, supra note 53, at 782–87 (echoing and 
supplementing Kamisar’s criticisms). 
A1 - BELLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/30/20112:18 PM 
2011] CRIME-SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS 27 
In theory, the greater the number of categories, the more precision that 
can be obtained in assessing reasonableness. Yet the success of any 
categorization scheme may depend on resisting this sentiment for three 
reasons. The first is complexity. As the pertinent categories become 
increasingly refined, police officers and courts will experience greater 
difficulty determining where particular offenses fall. Second, more 
categories means more disagreement as to the placement of particular 
offenses and greater inconsistency among courts, factors that would 
jeopardize the critical constitutional connection between crime severity and 
a socially shared conception of “reasonableness.” Indeed, in the Eighth 
Amendment context, the Supreme Court, while insisting on its competence 
to draw crime-severity distinctions “on a broad scale,” acknowledges that this 
capability quickly becomes strained as distinctions become more precise.110 
Third, and perhaps most important, there are only so many Fourth 
Amendment standards that courts can verbalize and apply. Review of a 
challenged search is not mathematics, and subtle distinctions between more 
than, say, three gradations of offenses would require great effort to achieve 
only illusory precision.111 Thus, at least until a need appears for more 
nuanced categorization, three categories should suffice: “grave,” “serious,” 
and “minor” crimes. 
As for placing crimes in each category, it is critical that courts avoid the 
temptation to defer to legislative classifications. As discussed below, 
deferring to the legislature, while quite sensible in many contexts, makes 
little sense as a means of construing Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 
The primary evil that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment sought to 
eliminate was the general warrant—often a creature of legislation.112 The 
Supreme Court, thus, recognizes in related contexts the absurdity of 
 
 110. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–94 (1983) (explaining that “courts are 
competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale” because “there are 
generally accepted criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad scale, 
despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between similar crimes”). 
 111. This point distinguishes the related challenge of calculating offense seriousness for 
purposes of sentencing. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS 
GUIDELINES 99 (1987) (deeming “sensible” the Minnesota Sentencing Commission’s decision 
to distinguish ten categories of offense seriousness). As the federal sentencing guidelines 
demonstrate, sentences can be calculated in precise numerical increments. See generally U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/TitlePage_Citation_ToC.pdf. 
 112. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 362 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Statutes 
authorizing unreasonable searches were the core concern of the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment.”); CUDDIHY, supra note 22, at 151–61, 469–76 (describing vast body of English 
legislation that authorized searches pursuant to general warrants); Davies, supra note 22, at 583, 
590 (stating that “[n]o one questions that the Framers despised and sought to ban general 
warrants” and explaining that “the Framers adopted constitutional search and seizure 
provisions with the precise aim of ensuring the protection of person and house by prohibiting 
legislative approval of general warrants”). 
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deeming a search or seizure performed by the executive branch either 
reasonable or unreasonable by reference to the opinion of the legislative 
branch. Writing for eight Justices in Virginia v. Moore, Justice Scalia noted 
that there is “no historical indication that those who ratified the Fourth 
Amendment understood it as a redundant guarantee of whatever limits on 
search and seizure legislatures might have enacted.”113 Instead, the 
Amendment embodies the sentiment that “founding-era citizens were 
skeptical of using the rules for search and seizure set by government actors 
as the index of reasonableness.”114 
Further, the Supreme Court often emphasizes the need to avoid 
“linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law”—the law that would 
most commonly be called upon, as in Welsh, to define offense severity.115 
Doing so would result in constitutional rules that “vary from place to place 
and from time to time.”116 Finally, expanding on this last thought (“time to 
time”), any offense-severity categorization that depends on legislative 
classification would be vulnerable to manipulation. Legislatures could alter 
the relevant classifications to increase police officers’ investigative authority, 
causing a search or seizure that was unreasonable one day to be reasonable 
the next.117 
As tempting as it may be, then, deferring to legislative classification is 
not the answer. Instead, for practical reasons and as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation, crime severity must, like other aspects of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, be measured objectively, by a judge 
channeling the views of a hypothetical reasonable person.118 Canadian 
 
 113. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); see also Davies, Post-Framing Adoption, 
supra note 33, at 24 & n.96. 
 114. Moore, 553 U.S. at 169. 
 115. Id. at 176. 
 116. Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 117. See Colb, supra note 48, at 1683 (criticizing Welsh for “disavow[ing] any judicial 
judgment about the significance of the actual violation” and warning that “[i]f Wisconsin were 
unhappy with the Court’s decision, it could, therefore, nullify it prospectively by simply 
changing (legislatively) the status of driving while intoxicated from a civil violation to a criminal 
offense”); Schroeder, supra note 21, at 499 (noting that the Fourth Amendment should “not 
[be] subject to arbitrary change or manipulation by legislatures or courts”); Volokh, supra note 
10, at 1974 (recognizing danger of legislative manipulation in this context). A further problem 
is that legislative assignments of maximum sentences may not be indicative even of the 
legislature’s view of the seriousness of the crime. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 763 
(1984) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the legislature may have limited “the penalties 
imposed on first offenders in order to increase the ease of conviction and the overall deterrent 
effect”); VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 100 (recognizing that statutory penalties may be 
influenced by “considerations other than seriousness”). 
 118. Reasonable-person standards are common in Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., 
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (“[A] seizure occurs if ‘in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)); Florida v. 
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jurisprudence relies on a reasonable-person standard in an analogous 
circumstance of determining whether evidence obtained in a questionable 
manner must be excluded at trial to avoid “bring[ing] the administration of 
justice into disrepute.”119 In this context, Canadian Supreme Court Justice 
Lamer explains, “[t]he reasonable person is usually the average person in 
the community, but only when that community’s current mood is 
reasonable.”120 Thus, the reasonable-person standard is “not left to the 
untrammeled discretion of the judge” or the vagaries of public opinion but 
is a judicial determination “grounded in community values and, in 
particular, long term community values.”121 This exercise of drawing upon 
community norms to apply an objective reasonableness standard should 
look familiar. It is, in essence, the same analytical exercise the United States 
Supreme Court undertakes in determining whether a search has occurred in 
the first place under the venerable “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test.122 
Reliance on a reasonable-person standard in the crime-severity context 
draws strength from the broad societal consensus as to the most serious and 
 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s 
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (identifying as key Fourth Amendment inquiry: 
“would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate”). 
 119. R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, para. 20 (Can.). 
 120. Id. at para. 33; see also Morissette, supra note 31, at 538 (elaborating on the benefits of 
the “reasonable man” standard in Canadian jurisprudence). Canadian jurisprudence has a 
complicated history with respect to considering crime severity in this analysis. See Collins, 1 
S.C.R. 265, at para. 35 (recognizing as a pertinent factor: “[I]s the offence serious?”); R. v. 
Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, paras. 62, 66, 84 (Can.) (expressing dissatisfaction with the case 
law that had evolved under Collins and, in the process of providing “clarification” as to multi-
factored approach, ruling that offense seriousness “cut both ways” and was thus always a neutral 
factor in the exclusionary calculus). 
 121. Collins, 1 S.C.R. 265, at para. 34. A similar approach could be to view relative crime 
severity through a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,” where those who craft a crime hierarchy must 
do so without knowing its implications for their personal interests. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Cf. Robert Weisberg, IVHS, Legal Privacy, and the Legacy of Dr. 
Faustus, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 78 (1995) (“[T]o return Fourth 
Amendment law—or supplementary statute law—to what philosophers call the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance—that idealized condition in which we convene to establish the best rules for our 
society before anyone of us knows whether she personally will turn out to be the beneficiary or 
the victim of the rules.”). 
 122. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“[I]n order to claim the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation 
of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has ‘a 
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.’” (quoting Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 & n.12 (1978) (emphasis added)); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740 (1979) (explaining that a search occurs when the authorities invade an expectation of 
privacy that “society is prepared to recognize” as reasonable). 
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most trivial offenses. While views as to absolute severity vary among social 
groups, social-science literature points to “the existence of wide general 
agreement and stability across different social sectors and population groups 
with regard to the relative seriousness of behaviors considered to be 
criminal.”123 Paul Robinson and Robert Kurzban recently surveyed this 
literature, remarking on the “extraordinary extent of agreement across a 
variety of issues and demographics,” with various methodological 
approaches yielding conclusions that “are all essentially the same, 
confirming the existence of shared intuitions as to relative seriousness of 
different variations on wrongdoing.”124 The Supreme Court already 
recognizes the salience of this literature as an aid to assessing relative crime 
severity in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.125 
In the social-science literature, the crimes engendering “wide general 
agreement” as among the most severe involve “traditional common law-
based criminal acts such as ‘a parent beats his young child to death,’ 
‘planned killing of a person for a fee,’ ‘forcible rape of a neighbor,’ and 
‘armed robbery of a bank.’”126 Analogous crimes identified as most serious 
in public surveys include aggravated assaults, stranger kidnappings, and 
other armed robberies.127 Absent some reasoned basis to reject the societal 
 
 123. Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness and Support 
for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel: A Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
103, 106–07 (2003) (summarizing literature); see VON HIRSCH, supra note 97, at 65 (explaining 
that, while there is continuing debate on this point, the existing “studies show that people from 
different walks of life tend to rate the gravity of common criminal acts similarly”); Michael 
O’Connell & Anthony Whelan, Taking Wrongs Seriously: Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, 36 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 299, 301 (1996) (surveying literature and concluding that “[t]here 
appears to be agreement on consensus” that is “best stated by [P.H.] Rossi and [P.H.] Henry” as 
follows: “Remarkable degrees of consensus obtain . . . across populations within sub-groups [but 
the] . . . agreement on the relative ordering of criminal acts is compatible with considerable 
differences in the absolute level of seriousness attributed to any given act”). Similarly, H.L.A. 
Hart refers to a “commonsense scale of gravity” in describing the need for a rational criminal 
justice system to assign proportional punishments for varying offenses. H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968). 
 124. Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1855 (2007). 
 125. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–94 (1983) (supporting assertion that “courts are 
competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale,” by noting social-
science literature that suggests “there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of 
crimes” (citing Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual 
Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 237 (1974))). 
 126. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the 
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1565 (1997) (discussing MARVIN E. 
WOLFGANG ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
CRIME SEVERITY (1985)). 
 127. See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 126, at 49–50 (listing kidnapping, intentional 
shootings, and armed robberies among offenses perceived to be most serious in comprehensive 
survey of offense severity). The phrase “armed robbery” is intended to avoid inclusion of less 
dangerous, unarmed robberies. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime Is Not the 
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consensus with respect to the severity of these crimes, courts could identify 
these offenses (and other directly analogous crimes) as forming the core of 
a category of offenses that a reasonable person would deem most severe. As 
the social-science literature indicates, people in all strata of American society 
fear these offenses above all others and, presumably, expect police to 
respond most aggressively to catch those who would commit them.128 
 
Problem: A Reply, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (1998) (“[R]obbery is both itself a violent 
crime and one leading cause of criminal homicide.”). 
 128. See Delbert S. Elliott, Life-Threatening Violence Is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on 
Prevention, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (1998) (noting that when considering life-
threatening violent crime, “[t]he most inclusive definition would include all homicides, 
nonnegligent manslaughters, robberies, and aggravated assaults”). For a discussion of the 
complexities of developing theoretical grounds for ranking offense severity, see Andrew von 
Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 81–83 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992). Elsewhere, von Hirsch suggests a theoretical basis 
for determining offense severity based on the degree to which offenses “restrict people’s ability 
to direct the course of their own lives,” a theory that “accounts for our sense of the gravity of 
violence, for violence restricts victims’ choices so drastically” and explains “why economic 
crimes can also be serious.” VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 101. He also argues, 
consistent with the discussion in the text, that popular assessments of offense severity alone 
should not determine offense seriousness, but such judgments “need to be supported by 
reasons.” Id. at 100. 
See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 126, at 47–50 (chart). A team headed by Paul Robinson 
recently surveyed residents of New Jersey and Pennsylvania to evaluate offense grading. See Paul 
H. Robinson et al., Report on Offense Grading in New Jersey (Jan. 10, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737825 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-03); Paul H. Robinson et al., Report on Offense Grading 
in Pennsylvania (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527149 (Univ. of Pa. 
Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-01). The 
surveys, although not tailored to the Fourth Amendment inquiry, are consistent with the social-
science literature described above. In the Pennsylvania survey, the offenses rated above 5.5 on a 
relative severity scale were murder, arson, keeping an adult slave, threatening a judge at 
gunpoint in retaliation for a ruling, various sex offenses, selling an infant, rape of a minor, 
shooting a firearm into a structure for purposes of ethnic intimidation, and threatening a 
witness at gunpoint in retaliation for testifying. Robinson, Report on Offense Grading in 
Pennsylvania, supra, at 58–62. The offenses rated below 2.0 included various nonviolent 
offenses, such as failing to disperse, fraud, and trespassing (there do not appear to have been 
any survey questions evaluating drug possession or traffic offenses). Id. In the New Jersey survey, 
the offenses rated above 5.5 were arson, kidnapping, and other violent crimes, as well as the 
somewhat esoteric offenses of unlawful importation of radioactive material and the unlawful 
sale of cows with “mad cow” disease. Robinson, Report on Offense Grading in New Jersey, supra, 
at 44–49. Offenses rated below 2.0 included obscenity offenses and possession or use of 
marijuana. Id. Interpretation is complicated by the understandable use of narratives in place of 
offense definitions. See id. at 16 & n.123; Robinson, Report on Offense Grading in 
Pennsylvania, supra, at 10–11. In some of the narratives, the measured offense is paired with a 
second offense, and it is likely that survey participants rated the severity of the combined 
offense. See, e.g., id. at 49, 61 (evaluating severity of “unlawful use of body vests” through 
narrative: “John illegally wears a bullet-proof vest during an attempt to kill his neighbor”). 
Canadian authorities undertook another recent effort to determine relative crime severity 
by reviewing the actual sentences given to offenders in Canadian courts. The results track the 
surveys described above. See CANADIAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATISTICS CANADA, 
MEASURING CRIME IN CANADA: INTRODUCING THE CRIME SEVERITY INDEX AND IMPROVEMENTS TO 
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This description of crimes a reasonable person would deem most 
serious neatly parallels Garner’s holding, delimiting the circumstances when 
it is constitutionally reasonable to “seize” a fleeing suspect with deadly force. 
The Garner Court states that deadly force (and thus the most intrusive type 
of seizure) is reasonable if the suspect threatens an officer with a weapon “or 
there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving 
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”129 Garner, 
thus, provides doctrinal support for the principle at the core of this Article: 
As a matter of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, crimes involving the 
threat of serious physical harm warrant more intrusive government 
responses than crimes that do not.130 In fact, Garner suggests a workable 
shorthand for the category of “grave” offenses: offenses involving the intentional 
infliction, or threatened infliction, of serious physical harm. 
Viewing relative crime severity through the eyes of a reasonable person 
can also generate a category of “minor” offenses. These crimes parallel what 
Margaret Raymond calls “penumbral crime,” crimes “defined by a high level 
of noncompliance with the stated legal standard, an absence of stigma 
associated with violation of the stated standard, and a low level of law 
enforcement or public sanction.”131 Examples of crimes fitting this 
description—essentially, laws that are commonly violated with little lasting 
harm to anyone but, arguably, the violator—can again be identified with the 
assistance of crime-perception surveys. The most comprehensive survey lists 
the following crimes as least serious: truancy, vagrancy, illegal gambling, 
trespassing, public drunkenness, noise disturbances, drug possession, simple 
assault, petty theft, and prostitution.132 Reasoning by analogy from these 
offenses reveals other crimes that should be included in the “minor” offense 
category, such as jaywalking, riding a bicycle on the sidewalk,133 and routine 
traffic and regulatory offenses. Again, absent some reasoned basis for 
recategorization, the listed offenses would form the core of the “minor 
 
THE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SURVEY (2009), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-
004-x/85-004-x2009001-eng.pdf. 
 129. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
 130. See Schroeder, supra note 21, at 528–29 (recognizing potential merits of crime-severity 
distinctions that relate to the presence or absence of violence and recognizing that Garner 
supports such an approach); cf. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (suggesting 
that Terry stops might be more reasonable when conducted as part of investigations of “felonies 
or crimes involving a threat to public safety”); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (mandating 
harsher penalties for offenders with prior violent felonies, defined as a felony that “has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another”). 
 131. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1395 (2002). 
 132. See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 126, at 47 (chart). 
 133. A surprising number of cases involve police contact based on violations of bicycle 
ordinances. See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 238 F.3d 198, 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a 
challenge to seizure by police who observed defendant riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, even 
though pertinent New York statute contained numerous exceptions). 
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offense” category, with the inclusion of other analogous offenses resulting 
from a filtering of public sentiment through the prism of objective 
reasonableness—a judicial exercise that joins reasoned distinctions as to 
crime severity with widely shared community values.134 
Crafting a category of the most serious offenses and a category of the 
least serious crimes results in a de facto residual category of crimes of 
moderate severity, which can be labeled “serious,” but not “grave.” 
Representative crimes include selling drugs, drunk driving, embezzlement, 
and money laundering.135 In the three-tiered categorization scheme set forth 
above, this middle category functions as a “demilitarized zone,” providing a 
buffer between the “grave” and “minor” crimes that will minimize 
disagreement and confusion as to the proper placement of offenses. Only 
crimes that are particularly distinguished either as “minor” or “grave” would 
escape categorization as “serious,” and investigations of crimes falling into 
this broad “serious” category would be treated as they always have for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. 
It would be folly, at an early stage in the doctrine’s development (i.e., as 
here, stage zero), to attempt to place every crime in a category. Rather, each 
of the three categories sketched above should be filled out by judicial 
decisions until the wide swath of crimes now in existence are categorized. A 
robust series of examples along with principles that enable broad 
categorization, as postulated above, would enable courts to categorize by 
analogy until judicial consensus is reached as to most extant crimes. It is 
worth emphasizing on this point that while penal codes contain a dazzling 
number of crimes, most police officers spend the bulk of their time 
investigating a small subset of these crimes that, due to their ubiquity, would 
quickly be categorized by judicial decision.136 
 
 134. See R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, para. 33 (Can.). Popular survey data, while 
informative, should not be dispositive. See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 100 (arguing, 
in the sentencing context, that popular assessments of offense severity alone should not 
determine offense seriousness, but such judgments “need to be supported by reasons”). 
 135. Some crimes will fall into this middle category due to the absence of a societal 
consensus as to their relative severity. Robinson and Kurzban found less agreement when they 
tested subjects’ views of the relative seriousness of drug offenses, prostitution, and bestiality. See 
Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 124, at 1890–91. The lack of agreement in the study could be 
an artifact of its design. See id. at 1883 (reporting that subjects were first asked to rank relative 
severity of twenty-four crimes and then, only upon completion, asked to rank twelve new crimes 
in relation to existing twenty-four-crime framework; the subjects showed consistency in ranking 
twenty-four crimes, but exhibited less agreement with respect to relative ranking of twelve new 
crimes). It may also suggest, as the authors contend, that “the closer conduct is to the core of 
physical injury of persons or property, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges, 
the greater will be present-day agreement about its relative blameworthiness.” Id. at 1891. 
 136. See Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2174 (“The large majority of Terry stops are based on 
suspicion of one of a half-dozen offenses.”); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 80, at 204 tbl.299 
(reporting statistical breakdown of United States arrests by crime). 
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A final consideration is whether to permit differentiation between 
offenses nominally categorized as identical. Should the teenager’s kick in 
United States v. Schmidt137 be distinguished from a near fatal stabbing, even 
though both offenses could be deemed assault with a dangerous weapon? It 
seems that the overarching inquiry as to “reasonableness” requires an 
affirmative answer.138 Nevertheless, such departures from a general offense 
categorization should be rare. As discussed in Part III.B, if courts focus 
myopically on case-specific classification, there is a danger that they will 
deem all crime “grave” or “serious,” rendering the notion of relative crime 
severity meaningless. 
IV. APPLYING THE CRIME-SEVERITY FRAMEWORK 
The preceding Part sketches the contours of a framework for 
identifying a crime-severity variable that can be incorporated into 
assessments of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. This Part explores 
specific applications of this approach. It begins by distinguishing the 
application of a crime-severity variable in two doctrinal settings—one where 
incorporation of crime severity will be relatively easy and, a second, where 
incorporation is more difficult. 
A. INCORPORATING CRIME SEVERITY INTO GENERAL REASONABLENESS ASSESSMENTS 
Crime-severity considerations can be most readily incorporated into the 
pockets of Fourth Amendment doctrine governed solely by freeform 
reasonableness analysis. In these so-called “special needs” contexts, crime 
severity would simply become one of the common-sense considerations that 
courts apply in assessing “reasonableness, under all the circumstances.”139 
For example, school searches fall into the “special needs” category. 
Consequently, “the legality of a search of a student” depends “simply on the 
 
 137. United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 138. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 866 (arguing in context of regulating prosecutor’s 
subpoena authority that crime-severity distinctions should not only be substantive, but 
“thoroughly case-specific”). 
 139. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (evaluating searches of public-school 
students). This “inconsistent tangle of case law” is difficult to characterize. For a general 
discussion, see Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 
DUKE L.J. 843, 926 (2010) (concluding that the doctrine consists of “an inconsistent tangle of 
case law, justified by a broad Fourth Amendment loophole whose premise—that detecting and 
preventing violent crime is not a law enforcement purpose—borders on the absurd”); see also 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the Court has recognized “‘special needs’ exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment . . . in a patchwork quilt of settings: public school principals’ searches of students’ 
belongings, T.L.O.; public employers’ searches of employees’ desks, O’Connor; and probation 
officers’ searches of probationers’ homes, Griffin,” where “each time the Court has found that 
‘special needs’ counseled ignoring the literal requirements of the Fourth Amendment for such 
full-scale searches in favor of a formless and unguided ‘reasonableness’ balancing inquiry”). 
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reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”140 Under 
existing doctrine, however, one circumstance appears out of bounds. The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the legality of a school search is not 
“dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various 
school rules.”141 Justice Stevens’s response to this point in dissent resonates 
far beyond the school-search context: “[f]or the Court, a search for curlers 
and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code is apparently just as 
important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent gang 
activity.”142 
Of course, a search to enforce the school dress code is not as important 
as the same search to investigate a violent crime, and the doctrine should 
reflect that intuition. In fact, once a workable framework for evaluating 
relative seriousness is constructed, crime severity should be a central variable 
(along with intrusiveness) in assessing the reasonableness of school searches. 
Whether a school official conducts a strip search of a student or monitors 
students electronically (intercepting e-mail, videotaping school bathrooms, 
or via GPS tracking), a court evaluating the constitutionality of that search 
should weigh its intrusiveness against the public interest. Public interest, 
here, should be defined both by the quantum of suspicion that a student 
violated some rule and the seriousness of the rule violated. All things being 
equal, a search aimed at identifying a student rapist (a “grave” crime) would 
be on firmer constitutional ground than the same search to determine if 
students were stealing soda, smoking in the bathroom, or leaving campus for 
lunch (“minor” offenses). 
Due to the unbounded nature of the constitutional analysis in this 
context, no further rules (apart from those already developed in the 
preceding Part) are necessary. A crime-severity variable can be factored into 
the freeform reasonableness calculus just like any other pertinent 
consideration, causing searches that target minor crimes more likely to be 
deemed unreasonable, and searches that target grave offenses more likely to 
be deemed reasonable. 
B. CRIME SEVERITY AND BRIGHT-LINE RULES 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence often relies on so-called bright-line 
rules to separate government actions that are per se reasonable from those 
that are per se unreasonable.143 While it is easiest to incorporate crime 
 
 140. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
 141. Id. at 342 n.9. The Supreme Court’s existing school-search jurisprudence provides 
mixed signals on the propriety of crime-severity considerations, holding that such 
considerations are irrelevant in determining if a search is reasonable in its inception, but 
perhaps relevant to determining the permissible scope of that search. Id. 
 142. Id. at 377, 380 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 143. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, § 2.9(f), at 102–03 (describing the Court’s 
inconsistent approach to bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context). 
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severity (or any variable) into the freeform reasonableness analysis discussed 
in the preceding Part, crime severity can also be incorporated into an 
analysis governed by bright-line rules. Indeed, this is essentially what the 
Supreme Court did in Welsh—creating a “minor crime” exception to an 
exigent-circumstances rule that otherwise permitted warrantless entry. 
The general approach would be fairly straightforward. If a rule would 
ordinarily render a search or seizure per se reasonable, the defendant (in a 
close case) could invoke an exception when the targeted offense was 
“minor.” Conversely, if a rule would deem a search or seizure per se 
unreasonable, the government could invoke an exception if the targeted 
offense was “grave.” Unlike in Welsh, however (and more like Illinois v. 
McArthur),144 the invocation of these exceptions should not determine the 
issue. Rather, the availability of the exception would free the legal analysis 
from the confines of the bright-line rule, allowing “totality of the 
circumstances,” reasonableness balancing, as in the “special needs” context. 
The mechanics of the proposed approach can be explored by revisiting 
Atwater and Mincey.145 In Atwater, the Court claimed to be hamstrung by the 
per se rule deeming an arrest reasonable whenever an officer had probable 
cause to suspect a person of a crime. Consequently, a custodial arrest of a 
parent in a car full of children for a seatbelt violation became per se 
reasonable, as opposed to actually reasonable, even though the seatbelt 
violation was not a jailable offense.146 The alternative approach proposed 
here would allow the suspect in a case like Atwater to invoke an exception to 
the per se rule based on the “minor” nature of her underlying offense. Her 
seizure could then be individually analyzed in light of its intrusiveness and 
the public interest furthered to determine Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness. While this approach inevitably requires some degree of case-
by-case analysis, various categories of arrests for minor offenses would likely 
become de facto reasonable—e.g., arrests necessary to fingerprint a suspect 
who has no identification, to protect the suspect or others (e.g., public 
drunkenness), or to prevent ongoing violations. The simple fact of an 
offense, however, would no longer establish the reasonableness of an arrest. 
The advantages of the doctrinal change described above would not 
accrue solely to suspects. An analogous approach, favoring law enforcement, 
 
 144. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). The Court in McArthur, after applying the 
general exigent-circumstances rule to affirm the constitutionality of the search, noted that the 
offense at issue—drug possession—was fairly minor and seemed to find it necessary to evaluate 
the overall reasonableness of the contested search in comparison to the search in Welsh. The 
Court emphasized that the offense was not as minor as the one in Welsh and the intrusion less 
severe. Id. at 336; see discussion supra Part I.C. 
 145. See discussion of Atwater and Mincey supra Part I.A. 
 146. See Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American Criminal Procedure, 
69 MD. L. REV. 261, 280 (2010) (noting that under any regime with bright-line rules, it is 
inevitable that some people will have their rights violated and that “[t]hese people are a sort of 
collateral damage from the bright-line rule”). 
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could be applied in cases like Mincey, where a bright-line rule forbidding 
certain actions would yield in an investigation of a grave offense. Again, case-
by-case analysis would be required, but de facto rules would inevitably result. 
For example, a rule like that once followed by the Arizona courts could 
permit warrantless searches (with probable cause) of single-family residences 
whenever police, having lawfully entered, encounter a victim of a “grave” 
crime.147 
C. OBJECTIONS TO OBSCURING BRIGHT-LINE RULES 
A likely objection to the approach sketched in the preceding section is 
that it will reduce the clarity of Fourth Amendment doctrine, particularly 
with respect to those areas of search and seizure law governed by bright-line 
rules. According to the most general form of this objection, introducing any 
new variable into the calculus complicates the task of police officers and 
increases the potential for inconsistency and confusion in the lower 
courts.148 
There are two responses to this objection. First, it overstates the clarity 
and efficacy of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Even the so-called 
bright-line rules that dot the Fourth Amendment landscape are intersecting, 
multilayered, highly nuanced, and rarely absolute.149 As Albert Alschuler 
explains, these rules often “muddy rather than clarify” and fail to recognize 
that a critical component of police work is the exercise of overall judgment 
in line with a broad “rule of reason” (i.e., reasonableness) that ultimately 
may be preferable as a constitutional standard, “not only from the 
 
 147. See State v. Sample, 489 P.2d 44, 46 (Ariz. 1971) (allowing police to “mak[e] a 
warrantless search of the premises in which the victim is found dead”). 
 148. Orin Kerr provides a practical defense of clear rules governing police-officer conduct, 
arguing that courts must provide clear guidance to minimize social costs of the exclusionary 
rule. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 527–28 
(2007); cf. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Fourth Amendment: Elusive Standards; Elusive Review, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 127, 143–44 (1991) (explaining that when “the court intends [F]ourth 
[A]mendment rules to guide and influence police behavior, the court will try to define the rule 
in terms that a law enforcement officer can hope to understand and apply with some degree of 
accuracy”). This imperative for clear rules is less compelling here, however, because the 
proposed divergence from the bright-line rules increases the likelihood of exclusion only when 
police investigate less serious crimes. (Although, in some instances, evidence of serious offenses 
would be excluded if obtained during an investigation of a minor offense.) Further, the 
divergence has the countervailing effect of decreasing the likelihood of exclusion when police 
investigate grave crimes. 
 149. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (explaining that the rule 
authorizing vehicle searches incident to arrest, while “touted as providing a ‘bright line’” had, 
in fact, “generated a great deal of uncertainty”); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the 
Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 230 (1984) (critiquing argument that bright-line 
rules are preferable to more generic standards in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); cf. 
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules. Rather, it recognizes that no single set of 
legal rules can capture the ever-changing complexity of human life.”). 
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perspective of the sound administration of public justice, but also from the 
perspective of the officer himself.”150 Take, for example, the search of the 
home—a paradigmatic privacy invasion that courts, after centuries of 
jurisprudence, regulate with some of the clearest doctrinal rules. The 
doctrine begins with a “presumpt[ion]” that an officer must have a warrant 
to enter a home.151 Even with a warrant, though, an officer cannot enter the 
home if the warrant is facially defective,152 which means “obviously deficient” 
(not that it “simply omit[s] a few items from a list of many to be seized, or 
misdescribe[s] a few of several items. . . [or contains] what fairly could be 
characterized as a mere technical mistake or typographical error”).153 An 
officer does not need a warrant to enter a home if the officer receives 
consent from the occupant, or someone else with “apparent authority” 
(except if a co-occupant, also present, disagrees),154 or there are “exigent 
circumstances,” which means “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the 
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”155 Of course, under 
Welsh, this last “rule” does not apply if the targeted offense is “relatively 
minor.”156 In addition, police can only rely on exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless search so long as they did not “violate or threaten to 
violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency.”157 To call this thicket 
a bright-line rule governing the entry of a home is an insult to lines (or 
brightness). And this is about as clear as it gets. 
Akhil Amar exaggerates when he critiques Fourth Amendment 
doctrine’s pretension to concrete rules as follows: “[w]arrants are not 
required—unless they are”; “[a]ll searches and seizures must be grounded in 
probable cause—but not on Tuesdays.”158 The critique, however, rests on a 
central truth. It is often Fourth Amendment doctrine’s artificiality, not its 
lack of clarity, that most complicates the police officer’s task. Thus, while 
offense-severity distinctions may add an additional variable to search and 
seizure law, this variable simultaneously conforms that law to the 
overarching constitutional command of reasonableness, a command that 
may be easier to follow than many of the bright-line rules intended to give it 
effect. 
 
 150. Alschuler, supra note 149, at 231, 234. 
 151. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). 
 152. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). 
 155. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978)). 
 156. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984). 
 157. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011). 
 158. Amar, supra note 12, at 757. 
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A second response to the criticism that crime severity complicates 
existing doctrine is that if, in fact, clarity and reasonableness conflict, 
reasonableness should carry the day. It is, after all, reasonableness that the 
Constitution commands. Consequently, courts cannot lightly deem as 
“reasonable” an unreasonable search on the grounds of administrative 
convenience (although that is what occurs in cases like Atwater). Such 
sacrifices may be called for in extreme circumstances of administrative 
necessity, but as this Article has tried to show, it is far from clear that such 
circumstances justify transsubstantive doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that reasonableness trumps clarity in the paradigmatic 
circumstance where officers need ex ante clarity—the use of deadly force. 
Rather than adopt the bright-line rule urged upon it to allow deadly force to 
stop any fleeing felon, the Supreme Court requires officers to consider, inter 
alia, offense seriousness in assessing whether deadly force is permitted.159 
While such a rule arguably complicates the officer’s task, the rule must do so 
if it is to give effect to the Fourth Amendment’s “central requirement” of 
reasonableness.160 What is true for deadly force seizures is true for Fourth 
Amendment law generally. 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIME-SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS IN THE MODERN ERA 
The preceding Parts sketch the argument that crime severity should, 
and can be, incorporated into Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
assessments. The argument presented so far is timeless in that it applies 
equally to a search in 1797 or 2097. Indeed, judges may object on this 
ground: Fourth Amendment doctrine has worked well enough for decades 
without crime-severity distinctions, why change now? One answer, which will 
be developed in this Part, is that while Fourth Amendment doctrine may 
have been able to subsist without crime-severity distinctions in the past, its 
continued ability to do so is uncertain at best. This is because the distinct 
types of investigative techniques courts will confront in the coming decades 
are likely to exacerbate critical weaknesses in existing Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, leaving a gap that crime-severity analysis (or something like it) 
must fill. 
Traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine performs best when assessing 
venerable methods of search and seizure—a police officer stops a suspect on 
a street, pats down his clothes, looks through the suspect’s pockets, and 
ultimately, searches his home for items specified in a warrant. These types of 
 
 159. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20 (1985) (recognizing the “practical difficulties” 
inherent in the Court’s rule but emphasizing that “similarly difficult judgments must be made 
by the police in equally uncertain circumstances”); cf. Stuntz, supra note 9, at 2175 (arguing 
that “vagueness” is an overrated problem in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and that the 
central question in crafting legal rules is “whether police officers can know roughly where the 
boundaries are in practice”). 
 160. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). 
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searches generally fall within the broad middle ground of a hypothetical 
invasiveness spectrum; they unambiguously intrude upon an individual’s 
privacy (or mobility), but do so only partially, leaving much of the 
individual’s privacy intact. 
The next wave of controversial searches will differ from those 
traditionally encountered in two important ways. First, for some intrusions, 
the degree of privacy invasion will increase exponentially. The partial privacy 
invasions of a physical search of one’s possessions, car, or even a home will 
appear quaint in comparison to the invasions that can be accomplished with 
modern technologies. Second, modern technologies will simultaneously 
enable remarkably unintrusive techniques to gather much of the data that, 
traditionally, only a more intrusive search would reveal. These opposing 
facets of technologically enhanced searches will increasingly present 
difficulties for courts applying traditional doctrine. As discussed below, 
crime-severity distinctions, while not the entire answer, provide a ready 
means of alleviating these difficulties. 
1. The Importance of Crime-Severity Distinctions for Evaluating 
Particularly Intrusive Searches 
The coming storm in Fourth Amendment doctrine is particularly 
evident in the doctrine’s longstanding struggle to evaluate the 
reasonableness of unusually intrusive searches. When the Court confronts 
such searches, it inevitably abandons the otherwise applicable bright-line 
rules in favor of either case-specific, reasonableness assessments161 or special, 
new rules that apply only to a particularly intrusive type of search or 
seizure.162 Exemplifying the latter practice is the inglorious constitutional 
standard that governs border searches of a suspect’s alimentary canal.163 
Technological change will exacerbate existing doctrine’s difficulties 
with unusually intrusive searches. Modern technologies enable an increasing 
array of searches that, while not necessarily physically intrusive, have the 
potential to wholly eviscerate an individual’s privacy. For example, courts are 
just beginning to encounter the panoply of issues created by the 
proliferation of electronic hard drives (e.g., personal computers, flash 
drives, Blackberries, and iPhones) that, under existing doctrine, can 
purportedly be searched without a warrant or probable cause if encountered 
 
 161. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (ruling that compelled surgery to 
obtain a bullet from suspect’s body was unreasonable because the surgery was not without risk 
and the state could probably prove its case without the bullet). 
 162. See discussion of Garner supra Part I.C. 
 163. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 & n.4 (1985) (crafting 
special Fourth Amendment rule to permit customs agents to detain a suspect at the border for 
the purpose of monitoring her bowel movement but emphasizing that the rule does not 
necessarily apply to “strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches”). 
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during the course of an arrest, or without a warrant, if found in a car.164 In 
theory, such searches can be carried out even for trivial offenses such as the 
seatbelt violation in Atwater or, as the Fourth Circuit recently held, failing to 
disclose one’s name to a police officer.165 
The potential for traditional search and seizure doctrines, if left 
unaltered, to permit wholly “unreasonable” privacy intrusions is increasing 
not only because people store unprecedented amounts of private data on 
readily searchable electronic devices, but also because new technology allows 
the government to replace traditional surveillance techniques with far more 
comprehensive means of gathering information. In the coming years, the 
“stakeout” will be replaced by video surveillance and continuous GPS 
tracking. As the District of Columbia Circuit recently held, the difference in 
kind of the intrusiveness of this last form of surveillance from previous 
iterations renders the answers given by traditional doctrine (that no “search” 
occurs) obsolete.166 Video surveillance presents similar concerns, particularly 
where technology allows police to install miniature devices in private spaces 
that can capture and transmit video footage for weeks, months, or years at a 
time. Under existing doctrine, the Fourth Amendment’s strongest response to 
the enormous privacy invasions on the horizon is to require a warrant and 
probable cause that the surveillance will uncover evidence of a crime.167 In 
other words, nothing but the good graces of law enforcement and limited 
resources stands between the citizenry and cameras hidden in countless 
homes, watching for days on end, to ferret out evidence of marijuana 
possession or cable-television theft.168 
 
 164. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1088 (10th Cir.) (considering but 
declining to decide whether police could conduct a warrantless search of a laptop computer 
seized during a vehicle stop), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1028 (2009); United States v. Finley, 477 
F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that officer could search suspect’s cell phone without a 
warrant as search incident to arrest); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011) (upholding 
search of defendant’s cell phone incident to arrest); Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the 
Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 29 (2008) (explaining that authority to search a 
suspect’s iPhone incident to arrest “appears to follow from longstanding U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent laid down well before handheld technology was even contemplated”). 
 165. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding 
warrantless search of car passenger’s cell phone after arrest for giving a false name). 
 166. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir.) (disagreeing with other courts 
that have deemed continuous GPS monitoring not to be a search), cert. granted sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 2011 WL 1456728 (2010). 
 167. See, e.g., United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the 
“lengthy string of state court cases holding that citizens have a reasonable expectation not to be 
secretly surveilled inside a public bathroom stall” and, thus, that a warrant is required for such 
surveillance); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 168. Law enforcement’s use of this power (i.e., its “good graces”) will undoubtedly be 
shaped by political as well as judicial forces. An optimist might suggest that this means that such 
invasive searches will be shunned by police to avoid popular resentment, but a pessimist would 
counter that, at most, these forces will cause such searches to be borne by the least politically 
powerful such as minorities and the poor. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth 
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The Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Torres illustrates the limits of 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine with respect to unusually invasive, 
technologically enhanced searches.169 Torres evaluated surreptitious video 
surveillance conducted inside a suspected terrorist safe house pursuant to a 
warrant. In struggling with the case, the court emphasized the inadequacy of 
the “usual way” judges protect privacy interests (requiring probable cause 
and mandating warrants).170 The Seventh Circuit ultimately upheld the 
search, but at the same time, hinted at the approach advocated in this 
Article, stating: “[M]aybe in dealing with so intrusive a technique as 
television surveillance, other methods of control as well, such as banning the 
technique outright from use in the home in connection with minor crimes, 
will be required, in order to strike a proper balance between public safety 
and personal privacy.”171 
In a more recent case, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., an 
en banc Ninth Circuit panel recognized the inadequacy of traditional 
doctrinal safeguards (warrant requirements and probable cause) where the 
government seized large volumes of private electronic data (including 
private data of non-suspects) in an investigation of steroid use by 
professional athletes.172 Unable to take comfort, as the Seventh Circuit had, 
in the severity of the underlying offense, the panel rejected the seizure by 
deeming the government to have exceeded the scope of the warrants issued 
by the lower courts.173 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit also sought to curb 
future excesses by crafting from whole cloth a series of hoops that the 
government would have to jump through to obtain warrants for electronic 
data.174 In the wake of the ruling, prosecutors claimed to be “hobbled” in 
 
Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (1999) (“Privacy, as Fourth Amendment 
law defines it, is something people tend to have a lot of only when they also have a lot of other 
things.”). 
 169. Torres, 751 F.2d 875. 
 170. Id. at 882. 
 171. Id. The court did not elaborate on how such a limitation might work, and the “minor 
crimes” dicta does not appear to have achieved any traction in later case law. 
 172. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(stating that “electronic files are generally found on media that also contain thousands or 
millions of other files among which the sought-after data may be stored or concealed” and “[b]y 
necessity, government efforts to locate particular files will require examining a great many 
other files to exclude the possibility that the sought-after data are concealed there”), superseded 
by 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 173. Id. at 1003–04. 
 174. Id. at 1006 (crafting novel set of five rules for magistrates to follow in determining 
whether to issue warrant “to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage medium in 
searching for certain incriminating files, or when a search for evidence could result in the 
seizure of a computer”); see also United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir.) (opining 
that panel’s forward looking requirements were not supported by Supreme Court case law), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010). 
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other (more serious) investigations and petitioned for rehearing.175 The 
Justice Department’s brief in support of its request focused, predictably, not 
on the need to aggressively investigate professional athletes, but on the 
public’s interest in investigating child rapists, “spies and terrorists.”176 
Perhaps bowing to the weight of transsubstantive doctrine, the Ninth Circuit 
granted rehearing and rescinded the forward looking aspects of its earlier 
ruling, removing the obstacles that might have stymied the government in its 
investigations of more serious crimes.177 
As the Seventh and Ninth Circuit rulings indicate, existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine must be reshaped to meet the challenges presented by 
technological change. The precise parameters of the new doctrine will, of 
course, be worked out over time, but a potential approach suggested by the 
analysis thus far would be to use crime severity to create distinct categories 
of review for unusually intrusive surveillance. When law enforcement 
requests a warrant to conduct sweeping electronic data searches, video 
surveillance of private spaces, continuous GPS monitoring, and the like, the 
courts could separate such requests by crime seriousness. In the first 
category where police are targeting “minor crimes,” these searches should 
be deemed per se unreasonable and no warrant would issue. In the second 
category of “serious crimes,” reasonableness may depend on the 
government’s observing certain restrictions, such as those crafted by the 
Ninth Circuit panel in Comprehensive Drug Testing or suggested by 
commentators anticipating the dilemma presented in that case.178 In 
investigations of “grave” crimes, as in Torres, warrants would issue with the 
least or, as at present, no restrictions (assuming, of course, the requisite 
quantum of individualized suspicion is established). Whatever the precise 
doctrinal approach, however, where privacy invasions far exceed those 
involved in traditional searches, it is critical that courts consider all the 
circumstances, including crime severity, in assessing reasonableness. This 
will ensure that, when considering the breathtaking privacy intrusions 
looming on the technological horizon, courts can determine whether these 
 
 175. See John Roemer, Electronic Evidence Rules Now Hobbling Prosecutors, DAILY J., Aug. 11, 
2010. 
 176. Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 6–7, 
16, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354 
(9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2009). The brief never mentions the word “steroid” but does detail a stalled 
investigation into the rape of a four-year-old girl and a “complex national security case.” Id. 
 177. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1177 (calling “for greater vigilance on the part 
of judicial officers in striking the right balance between the government’s interest in law 
enforcement and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures”); 
see also id. at 1178–79 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (reiterating superseded requirements as 
purported “guidance”). 
 178. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1005, 1006–07 (2010); Ohm, supra note 16, at 1558. 
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searches are actually reasonable as opposed to some artificial, and ultimately 
incomplete, proxy for reasonableness. 
2. The Importance of Crime-Severity Distinctions for Applying the 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test to Relatively Uninvasive Searches 
While some new technologies enable extremely intrusive searches, 
others allow the state to gather vast amounts of private information in a 
manner that, at least as a matter of legal doctrine, is remarkably unintrusive. 
These latter intrusions fall into roughly two categories: (1) technologies that 
allow the state to gather private information, often from large groups of 
people, without decisively intruding on any one individual’s privacy (e.g., e-
mail filters, data mining, facial recognition software, familial DNA searches, 
and satellite imagery); and (2) technologies that allow the state to obtain 
private data about a suspect from a third party (e.g., searches of data 
obtained from phone companies, Internet service providers, or website 
operators, such as Google or Facebook). Current doctrine potentially leaves 
these types of privacy intrusions unregulated as “nonsearches” under the 
Fourth Amendment because they do not violate any “reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”179 Recognizing the staggering implications of this doctrinal blind 
spot, academics rightly criticize existing case law as out of touch with 
modern reality, rendering the Fourth Amendment increasingly irrelevant in 
a changing world.180 
 
 179. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding no Fourth 
Amendment search where government obtained subscriber information from Internet service 
provider after chat recipient informed government that defendant showed child pornographic 
video during Internet chat), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 440 (2010); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, 
§ 4.4(c), at 296 (recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment status of e-mail is still unsettled” and 
asserting that the argument that e-mail is not protected because it is revealed to a third party 
ISP is “plausible” but “probably not a winning” argument); Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to 
Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government 
Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291 (2011); Solove, supra note 15, at 356–57 (noting that 
“companies maintain detailed records of individuals’ personal information,” including 
“internet service providers, merchants, bookstores, phone companies, [and] cable companies” 
and when this data is provided to the government, third-party doctrine eliminates Fourth 
Amendment protections); infra note 180. 
 180. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. 
L. REV. 9, 83 (2004) (arguing that “the allure of electronic surveillance to law enforcement and 
its threat to privacy requires a comprehensive and workable framework that strictly limits 
government’s ability to surveil”); Kerr, supra note 178, at 1006–07 (recognizing that “the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to computer networks will require considerable 
rethinking of preexisting law”); Ohm, supra note 16, at 1558 (advocating increased Fourth 
Amendment protections because “reasonable expectations of privacy and the probable cause 
standard are not enough to ensure a sound balance between privacy and security in the face of 
widespread intermediation”); John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border 
with Cyberspace, 78 MISS. L.J. 241, 294 (2008) (“[I]t is time to rethink whether the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment is sufficient to protect individual privacy from intrusion by the state, 
especially with respect to data initially collected by private parties.”); Simmons, supra note 55, at 
1306 (arguing that if the Court continues on its current path, its doctrine “will inevitably 
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One consideration that has not been raised in the important debate 
regarding the Fourth Amendment parameters of novel technological 
intrusions is crime severity. At first glance, crime severity does not seem to 
implicate the threshold Fourth Amendment determination of whether an 
investigative tactic constitutes a “search.” A crime-severity variable, however, 
could quite plausibly be incorporated into the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test that the Supreme Court uses to draw the search–nonsearch 
distinction. This is because a critical component of this famously amorphous 
test is a “value judgment,”181 described by the Court as: whether a particular 
privacy interest is one that “society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”182 
Surveys that attempt to measure societal perceptions of the relative 
intrusiveness of police conduct conducted by Christopher Slobogin and 
Joseph Schumacher suggest that, at least as a descriptive matter, the privacy 
expectations that society would deem reasonable fluctuate with crime 
severity.183 As Slobogin explains, in the survey results, “the seriousness of the 
crime under investigation correlated inversely with intrusiveness ratings; 
 
result—indeed, has already resulted—in a gradual weakening of Fourth Amendment 
protections as investigative technologies become more sophisticated”); Omer Tene, What Google 
Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1470 (“[C]onstitutional 
doctrine for privacy protection in the United States is overly narrow and outdated, particularly 
in light of the market and technological developments of the past three decades.”). Other 
means of limiting privacy intrusions exist (e.g., through statutes), but none can provide as 
broad or as lasting protection as the Fourth Amendment. 
 181. SLOBOGIN, supra note 77, at 33 (criticizing the Court’s approach to this prong of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974) (arguing that the question courts should ask is 
“whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go 
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to 
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open 
society”); Kerr, supra note 148, at 505 (critiquing the test as follows: “Is it descriptive? Is it 
normative? Just what does it measure? The cases are all over the map, and the Justices have 
declined to resolve the confusion”). Justice Harlan, the author of the test, suggested a 
normative approach dissenting in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (“This question must . . . be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice 
and the likely extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against the 
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”). 
 182. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (describing reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy inquiry as consisting of “two discrete questions”: (1) “whether the individual, by his 
conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,”; (2) “whether the 
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 183. See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized 
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 767 (1993). Slobogin’s contention that the Court 
should incorporate population surveys as to the invasiveness of particular techniques, see 
generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 77, is analogous to the suggestion in Part III.C that the Court 
should incorporate surveys of crime severity in its assessment of the relative gravity of offenses. 
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thus, for instance, the scenario involving a pat-down for evidence of 
terrorism was seen as much less intrusive than the pat-down scenario that 
did not specify the evidence sought.”184 Given these findings, which support 
a fairly unsurprising intuition, a court grappling with the question of 
whether an investigative technique constitutes a “search,” could plausibly 
consider the severity of the crime under investigation.185 
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s omission of a crime-severity variable 
from the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,186 as in other areas of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, does not mean that the underlying intuition—that 
police officers act more reasonably (or less intrusively) when, all things 
being equal, their investigations target grave crime—disappears. To the 
contrary, the intuition is simply pushed underground, causing courts to 
gravitate toward other mechanisms for protecting society. Judges, like all of 
us, prefer that law enforcement employ all of its resources—where 
“reasonable”—to combat the most grave crimes. Transsubstantive doctrine, 
which artificially strips crime severity from the reasonableness calculation, 
creates a powerful incentive for courts to err on the side of deeming 
applications of challenged new technologies “nonsearches” for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment.187 This temptation is particularly acute where a 
 
 184. See Slobogin, supra note 28, at 1598; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 183, at 767 
(discussing variances in intrusiveness ratings for identical investigative tactics and explaining 
that a “possible explanation . . . is that the subjects allowed their attitudes toward the types of 
crime being investigated to affect their answers”). Slobogin views crime-severity-based variance 
in intrusiveness as “noise” that distorts the actual intrusiveness. This conclusion is not, however, 
the only one to be drawn from the data. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal et al., The Multiple Dimensions 
of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 353–54 (2009) 
(discussing Slobogin and Schumacher’s findings that providing subjects with context regarding, 
inter alia, the purpose of a search influenced the subjects’ views of intrusiveness and criticizing 
their conclusion that these findings suggest a flaw in the subjects’ intrusiveness assessments: 
“Doctrinally, that may not be so; psychologically, it is not clear that there are explicit grounds 
for making such a choice.” (citation omitted)). 
 185. Although plausible, this approach would likely be unsatisfactory, not because it distorts 
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, but because it moves the test far afield from its 
ostensible purpose—determining whether an investigative technique falls within the definition 
of the word “search.” As a consequence, incorporating crime severity into assessments of 
reasonable expectations of privacy could lead to the implosion of the test altogether, perhaps 
rightly so. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing 
the “notoriously unhelpful” reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test and advocating a return to 
the “clear text” of the Fourth Amendment “and 4-century-old tradition” of the meaning of the 
terms utilized there); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511 
(2010). 
 186. The Court generally acknowledges the context dependence of societal expectations of 
privacy, but not with respect to crime severity. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 654 (1995) (“What expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context, . . . 
depending, for example, upon whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home, 
at work, in a car, or in a public park.”). 
 187. Cf. SLOBOGIN, supra note 77, at 31 (criticizing Supreme Court’s doctrine as follows: 
“the only good explanation for the Court’s unwillingness to regulate so many actions that are 
A1 - BELLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/30/20112:18 PM 
2011] CRIME-SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS 47 
technology is generally applied prior to the development of individualized 
suspicion—e.g., data mining, DNA searches, or facial recognition software—
and, thus, deeming its use a “search” and requiring a warrant (based on 
probable cause) is tantamount to branding its use unconstitutional in all 
cases. Once applied, the “nonsearch” label leaves applications of the 
technology completely unregulated by the Fourth Amendment; the 
technology can then be utilized not just to (reasonably) combat grave 
crimes, but to (unreasonably) investigate minor ones as well. 
The incentive to label applications of cutting edge technologies 
“nonsearches” so that the technologies are then available to combat grave 
crime recedes once courts are permitted to consider offense severity in 
assessing reasonableness. Courts can then deem the use of such technologies 
“searches” constrained by Fourth Amendment reasonableness, while 
reserving the authority to uphold those searches as “reasonable” if, and only 
if, the circumstances, including crime severity, warrant. Thus, by more 
closely aligning Fourth Amendment reasonableness, with actual 
reasonableness, a doctrine that incorporates crime severity would likely 
capture more “searches.” This development (or its absence) will become 
increasingly significant as minimally invasive, but nonetheless disturbingly 
efficient, investigative techniques become ubiquitous in the modern era. 
CONCLUSION 
Proponents of the government’s reliance on powerful new investigative 
technologies commonly (and understandably) invoke the specter of 
increasingly sophisticated and dangerous criminals.188 Yet, the omission of 
crime severity from existing Fourth Amendment doctrine allows the 
government to use the same technologies (as well as time-honored 
 
clearly searches and seizures is that it has decided that the cost to law enforcement of doing so 
outweighs the ‘minimal’ intrusions involved”). For a possible demonstration of the courts’ 
nervousness about labeling the use of new technologies a search, see Warshak v. United States, 
490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[I]ndividuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in e-mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP.”); Warshak v. 
United States, 532 F.3d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (vacating panel opinion due to lack 
of standing). 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing 
dangers posed by terrorism suspects in upholding video surveillance as reasonable); Arcila, 
supra note 33, at 1334 (emphasizing pressure placed on Fourth Amendment doctrine by the 
9/11 attacks and potential biological, chemical, and technological attacks in a similar vein); 
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 579–81 (2009) 
(defending third party doctrine, in part, as a means to prevent criminals from using new 
technologies to shield activities that previously would have to be performed in public); 
Simmons, supra note 15, at 562 (discussing how modern criminals can use new technologies to 
cause great damage: “An anarchist in the nineteenth century might seek to assassinate a 
president or plant dynamite in an opera house—his twenty-first century counterpart has the 
ability to destroy cities with a nuclear weapon or poison an entire society with chemical or 
biological agents” (footnote omitted)). 
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techniques of varying intrusiveness) to investigate unsophisticated criminals 
and relatively insignificant crimes.189 Separating these distinct categories of 
crimes and criminals would provide a critical update to antiquated Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
There is nothing radical about the proposal advanced in this Article. 
The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,”190 and no 
common conception of reasonableness is complete without an assessment of 
the purpose of a particular search or seizure. A citywide dragnet for the 
Oklahoma City bomber may be reasonable, while the same dragnet targeting 
a parking ticket scofflaw would be absurd. The fact that Fourth Amendment 
doctrine recognizes no distinction between these scenarios suggests a serious 
flaw.191 
The proposed framework for incorporating crime severity into Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is no doubt vulnerable to criticism. Such 
disagreement is not fatal, however. The proposal is intended to suggest that 
crime severity can be incorporated into Fourth Amendment doctrine and to 
ignite a debate as to the proper parameters of this powerful consideration. 
As the debate unfolds, it is important to recognize that the status quo of 
largely ignoring crime severity is itself problematic, and likely to become 
increasingly so with technological change. The real question, then, is not 
whether a certain scheme for incorporating crime severity is flawed, but 
whether the scheme is more flawed than one that ignores crime severity 
altogether.192 
 
 189. United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1423 (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to incorporate into the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness inquiry the “glaring disproportionality between the intrusiveness of the raid and 
the four-month-old sale of sixty dollars’ worth of drugs that was offered to justify the raid”); 
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 853 (“Just as in some murder cases the law’s standards seem too high, 
they seem too low in thousands of cases involving less important offenses.”). 
 190. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
 191. The distinction currently available in the case law only applies in exigent 
circumstances (e.g., where the bomber is about to strike or immediately fleeing the crime). See 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
 192. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 843 (highlighting problems with transsubstantive doctrine); 
Volokh, supra note 10, at 1982 (noting difficulties of drawing lines between crimes but 
emphasizing that “there are problems with treating all crimes alike as well”). 
